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ABSTRACT
MYUNG-SOO YIE: The Term Structure and Cost Channel
Effect of Monetary Policy.
(Under the direction of Dr. Richard Froyen.)
Sims (1992) first recognized a puzzling protracted rise in the price level following
a contractionary monetary policy shock. Two groups of studies have addressed this
“price puzzle”. The first group suggests that the price anomaly can be resolved by
adding future inflation information to the policy rule, because they believe that this
undesirable result comes from the omission of important information available to the
monetary authority. The second group regards this price response as normal because
of the cost channel effect of monetary policy.
Since the effectiveness of monetary policy depends critically on the correct identi-
fication of the policy transmission mechanism, the recognition of the existence of the
cost channel is important for the policy makers. This paper provides evidence of the
cost channel effect through a structural VAR analysis. Based on empirical evidence,
I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which addresses the cost
channel effect.
My model focuses on two related features by which monetary policy affects real
variables. (1) The model derives the term structure of interest rates, which states that
the monetary policy action changes the market’s expectations on the current and future
short rate path that, in turn, determine the long rates. Despite the closer relationship
of macro variables to long rates than to short rates, the monetary authority adopts
the short rate as a policy instrument based on the belief of the existence of a channel
through which the short rate policy is transmitted to long rates. Moreover, many
iii
studies fail to take into account the direct impact of long rates on the economy. In
contrast, (2) my model highlights the role of long rates. I find that time lags in the
capital formation and long-term financing contracts by firms enhance the cost channel
effect, and generate the variables’ staggered responses. The monetary policy action
changes the short and long rates through the term structure of interest rates. Also the
firms’ borrowing pattern for both labor costs with short-term contracts and investment
projects with long-term contracts link the nominal short- and long-term interest rates
directly to firms’ marginal costs.
This paper incorporates a simple cash in advance feature, sticky prices and wages,
and habit formation. My model indicates that the price stickiness makes a limited
contribution to generate persistent responses, but the sticky wage amplifies the inertial
behavior of variables and ensures that the real wage responds in the direction that
the cost channel effect of monetary policy predicts. Contrary to the studies by Fuhrer
(2000) and Amato and Laubach (2004), in which they showed that habit formation
helps to explain the gradual response of macro variables such as output and inflation
to monetary policy shocks, habit formation in this paper only smoothes the response
of consumption across time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Sims (1992) first recognized a puzzling protracted rise in the price level following a
contractionary monetary policy shock. Two groups of studies have addressed this
“price puzzle.” The first group, which includes works such as Sims (1992) and Leeper,
Sims, and Zha (1996), suggests that the price anomaly can be resolved by adding future
inflation information in the policy rule, because they believe that this undesirable result
comes from the omission of important information available to the monetary authority.
According to Hanson’s (2004) study, however, there is little correlation between an
ability to forecast inflation and an ability to resolve the puzzle. The second group,
such as Barth and Ramey (2001), regards this price response as normal because of
the cost channel effect of monetary policy. Following the second group, this paper
provides evidence of the cost channel effect of the monetary policy transmission through
a structural vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. Based on empirical evidence, I
construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model which addresses the
prolonged co-movement of price responses with short rates.
Since the effectiveness of monetary policy depends critically on the correct identi-
fication of the policy transmission mechanism, the recognition of the existence of the
cost channel and the term structure channel is important for policymakers. As Ravenna
and Walsh (2006) noticed, the cost channel effect depends on the direct relationship
of nominal interest rates to the firms’ marginal costs.1 Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992a) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005, hereafter CEE) link a firm’s
financing cost of labor to the nominal short-rate. Li and Chang (2004) connect the
nominal interest rate to the production cost of capital by assuming that firms finance
business investment. Even though these studies successfully generate a cost channel
effect in the general equilibrium framework, they focus only on the short-term financing
cost.
Contrary to previous cost channel models, this paper emphasizes the role of long
rates for generating the cost channel effect and the persistent responses of the econ-
omy. This is based on the argument by Woodford (1999) and Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002) that macro variables are more closely related to long rates than short rates.
Therefore the term structure of interest rates is considered as an important monetary
policy transmission channel which connects the policy action to long rates. But previ-
ous macroeconomic models regarding a term structure relationship have mainly focused
on finding determinants of long rates and have paid less attention to the role of long
rates in the economy. The most well-known theory about the term structure of interest
rates is the expectations hypothesis, which states that the policy affects long rates by
changing the average of current and future short-rate expectations. But, as Ellingsen
and So¨derstro¨m (2001, 2004) noticed, some puzzling results observed in the term struc-
ture data cannot be explained by the expectations theory. First, long-term interest
rates respond more strongly to monetary policy innovation than the expected path of
short rates does. Second, since an exogenous increase in short rates should lower infla-
tion in the long run, a positive relationship between long and short rates is puzzling.
Third, even though the average relationship is positive, the relationship between long
and short rates varies over time. To resolve these puzzling results, recent studies such
1Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) emphasized the role of capital market imperfections and showed
that tighter liquidity constraints may generate counter-cyclical price movements through markups.
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as Ellingsen and So¨derstro¨m (2001, 2004) and Beechey (2004) rely on the asymmet-
ric information between private agents and the monetary authority. This asymmetric
information creates an inference problem for private agents, and the private agents’
inference on unobserved shocks affects the expectation path of short rates, hence the
behavior of long-term interest rates.
On the other hand, Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) and Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) em-
phasize the shift in private agents’ views of long-run inflation to explain the observed
violations of the expectations hypothesis. They argued that long-term interest rates
are more closely related to the market’s expectations on long-run inflation, which is
one of the goals for the monetary authority to stabilize. From their view, the Fisherian
relationship between nominal interest rates and anticipated changes in prices is more
important in determining the long-term interest rates.
Even though the empirical evidence is mixed, Cook and Hahn (1989) show that, on
the average, the overall term structure of interest rates increases, but declines with ma-
turity when the monetary authority raises short rates, which supports the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. Their findings can be supported by
Edelberg and Marshall (1996), and Evans and Marshall (2002), who argued that the
long-rate responses following monetary policy shocks move in the direction that the
expectations hypothesis implies. Favero (2005) also showed that the combination of a
Taylor rule and the expectations theory provide considerable support for the expecta-
tions hypothesis of the term structure.
But these efforts to resolve the behavior of long rates are not fully based on the
micro foundation. Moreover, they are all silent about the long rate’s effect on the
economy. Evans and Marshall’s (1998) study successfully introduces the term structure
of interest rates into the general equilibrium framework. But, by assuming that there is
no relationship between long rates and other variables, long-term bonds in their model
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become redundant assets. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) analyze the role of wage contracts
with a term structure relationship. The aggregate demand equation in their model
links the output gap and the ex ante long-term interest rate which is calculated from
the term structure equation. Their analysis, however, is not fully based on the micro
founded model, and fails to explain how the long rate affects output and inflation.
The DSGE model developed here, on the other hand, focuses on two related channels
through which monetary policy affects the economy. First, the model utilizes the term
structure of interest rates as a monetary policy transmission channel. Monetary policy
actions in the model change the market’s expectations of the current and future short
rate paths, which consequently determine long rates. The model states that the long-
term interest rates are the sum of two parts: the average of expectations of current and
future short rates and the term premium. The term premium is assumed to follow an
exogenous i.i.d. stochastic process with no relation to a monetary policy shock or other
macroeconomic shocks. This assumption implies that short-term interest rate policy
affects long rates through the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Some
empirical evidence about this assumption will be presented by examining the impulse
response functions of the term premium implied by the impulse responses of different
maturity yields to macro-economic shocks. Second, as a cost channel of monetary
policy, the change of both short and long rates affects macro variables such as output
and inflation. The direct impact of long rates on the economy is considered one of
the sources of staggered responses of macro-variables because the change of long rates
alters the firm’s long-run ability to produce output by investing in long-term investment
projects.
Time lags in the formation of capital stock and long-term financing contracts of
firms distinguish my model from previous cost channel models. They enhance the
cost channel effect and generate the staggered response of the economy. A time-to-
4
build feature that my paper adopts is introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) to
explain aggregate investment behavior as an alternative model to a capital adjustment
cost model. A capital adjustment cost model is intensively studied by Lucas (1967),
Gould (1968), and Hayashi (1982), among others. While they fail both to separate
the long- and short-run supply elasticities of capital and to recognize time lags in
completion of investment projects, Kydland and Prescott (1982) argue that the multi-
period formation of capital stock is a crucial factor for explaining aggregate fluctuations.
Financial intermediaries in my model are assumed to facilitate economic activity by
providing interest-bearing assets to households and financing contracts to firms. Some
behavioral assumptions on the financial market participants are made in order to avoid
an identification problem while connecting the nominal short- and long-term interest
rates directly to firms’ marginal costs. These assumptions are based on the matching
principle, which states that the maturity structure of debt matches the maturity of
projects or assets held by profit-seeking economic agents. First, firms use both short-
term loan contracts, for financing the cost of labor used in the production process every
period, and long-term loan contracts for financing the whole cost of investment projects
that take multiple periods to be used in the production process. Second, financial
intermediaries allocate resources by matching maturities between the source of funds
and the use of funds. Third, the loan markets are perfectly competitive markets. As a
result, nominal returns on short- and long-term bonds are equal to the short- and long-
term borrowing costs to firms, respectively. Hence, long-term bonds are not redundant
assets.
There are many studies that try to explain why firms use different maturity finan-
cial contracts in their production process. These studies can be categorized into three
groups: an agent or contracting cost hypothesis, a signal or liquidity risk hypothe-
sis, and a tax-based hypothesis. First, a contracting cost hypothesis states that the
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debt maturity is used to control the conflict of interest between equity-holders (stock-
holders) and debt-holders (bond-holders). It predicts the inverse relationship between
the debt maturity and growth opportunities, i.e., investment. Firms with risky debt
(risky bond, hence vulnerability to default) have an incentive on behalf of equity-
holders to reject projects with positive but low present value. This happens because
even if equity-holders, the investment decision makers, undertake the entire cost of the
projects including the risk of bankruptcy, they receive only a fraction of the returns by
sharing it with debt-holders. In the view of equity-holders, debt-holders appropriate
parts of their benefit created from bearing default risk. Therefore equity-holders will
have an incentive not to undertake projects with positive present value whenever the
value is lower than the amount of debt issued. This under-investment incentive can
be reduced by issuing short-term debt, which matures before investment decisions are
made. Therefore, firms prefer short-term debt to long-term debt. Debt-holders also will
try to avoid such a suboptimal investment being realized by reducing the stated period
of loan (Barclay and Smith 1995, Stohs and Mauer 1996, and Morgado and Pindado
2003).
Second, a signal or liquidity risk hypothesis states that, with positive transaction
cost, lower-quality firms self-select into long-term debt if they cannot afford the cost of
rolling over short-term debt, and high-quality firms signal their type by issuing short-
term debt to minimize adverse selection cost (Barclay and Smith 1995, Stohs and Mauer
1996)). Firms with the highest and lowest credit risk issue short-term debt because
firms with the highest credit ratings have small refinancing risk, and firms with very
poor credit ratings are unable to borrow long-term because of the extreme adverse-
selection costs. On the other hand, firms with intermediate credit risk issue long-term
debt. Since lenders are reluctant to refinance the debt if bad news arrives, the firms
with relatively low credit ratings prefer long-term debt to reduce the refinancing risk
6
(Barclay and Smith 1995).
Third, the tax-based model predicts that the interaction of borrowers’ preferences
for accelerating interest tax shields and lenders’ preferences for delaying the recognition
of interest income can cause borrowers to prefer long-term debt when the yield curve is
upward sloping. Hence, companies will use more long-term debt when the yield curve
is upward sloping (Barclay and Smith 1995).
Without theoretical background, we can also find some evidence that firms use long-
and short-term debt in the production process in Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic’s
(1999) study. They found by examining debt maturities of firms in 30 countries during
1980 and 1991 that large firms in developed countries have more long-term debt than
short-term debt. Moreover, small firms in countries with a large banking sector have
less short-term debt and their debt is of longer maturity. The authors conjecture
that the economies of scale of financial intermediaries in obtaining information and
in monitoring debtors would facilitate access to external finance, particularly among
smaller firms. They also find that the high ratio of net fixed assets to total assets is
positively correlated to the use of long-term debt, which implies that firms use their
fixed assets (as collateral) to obtain long-term debt.
The model incorporates a simple cash-in-advance (CIA) feature, sticky prices and
wages, and habit formation. In general, price and wage stickiness are thought to gen-
erate the persistent response of variables. But sticky wages turn out to be a more
important factor than sticky prices in deepening the inertial behavior and the cost
channel effect. Contrary to CEE (2005), who emphasize the role of variable capital
utilization to generate persistence in output and inflation, the time-to-build technology
and long-term loan contracts are crucial in my model. The studies by Fuhrer (2000)
and Amato and Laubach (2004) show that habit formation helps to explain the gradual
response of macro variables such as output and inflation to monetary policy shocks.
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But habit formation in this paper only smoothes the response of consumption across
time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapters 2 and 3, the preliminary
data analysis of the US economy will be carried out using a structural VAR analysis.
The evidence of a cost channel effect for monetary policy transmission and the role
of the term premium in the term structure of interest rates shown in the US data
will be discussed in these chapters. Chapter 4 presents the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model, which addresses the prolonged co-movement of price responses with
nominal interest rates. This chapter also includes the policy simulation exercises based
on the model economy. The impulse responses of the model economy to monetary
policy shocks will be compared to the empirical counterparts. Chapter 5 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Preliminary Data Analysis of the
US Economy
In this chapter, the impulse responses of the US economy following a monetary policy
shock will be examined with a structural VAR method. The identification scheme and
the well known puzzle concerning price movements will be discussed. This chapter also
analyzes the direction of long-rate responses on different maturity bonds and examines
what generates these long-rate responses to monetary policy shocks.
2.1 Identification
Two points must be checked in analyzing the effect of monetary policy shock with a
VAR. The first is related to the stability of structural models. In general, the model
estimated under a specific regime cannot be used in different monetary policy regimes.
To avoid this problem, I re-do the impulse response analysis with two different sub-
sample periods: the Pre-Volcker period and the Volcker-Greenspan period.
The second point is related to the identification problem of the policy instrument.
The policy instrument consists of two parts: an endogenous or systematic relationship
between the policy variables and non-policy variables and an unforecastable exoge-
nous policy shock. Correct identification of the systematic part is required because
the misspecification of the systematic part of the policy instrument produces puzzling
anomalies (Hanson 2004). Since the dynamic analysis of a VAR system may yield reli-
able information on the monetary transmission mechanism only after exogenous policy
actions are identified (Bagliano and Favero 1998), we also need to separate an unfore-
castable exogenous policy shock from the systematic part of the policy instrument.
Two different schemes for identifying the effect of policy innovation on the non-
policy variables can be considered. First, the central bank is assumed to observe only
past values of state variables when formulating the policy. That is, there is no feedback
from the economy to the central bank’s policy action within the period. We can achieve
this type of identification by ordering the policy variables first in the state vector. The
other identification method assumes that the central bank can observe current variables
as well as a history of the entire economy when it formulates the policy rule. Therefore
the central bank can react systematically to the change of current state variables.
This identification scheme can be achieved by placing policy variables after the current
observed state variables.
The model that I use for exploring the effect of the monetary policy shock adopts
the second identification scheme, which is employed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996, 1999). A VAR for a k × 1 state vector of variables, Xt, is given by
Xt = Φ(L)Xt−1 + ut, Eutu′t = V (2.1)
where L denotes a lag operator and ut is a vector of residual shocks whose variance-
covariance matrix is V . By pre-multiplying A0 on both sides of (2.1), the structural
VAR can be expressed by
A0Xt = A0Φ(L)Xt−1 + et, et = A0ut (2.2)
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where the structural shock vector et has a covariance matrix Eete
′
t = I. After esti-
mating (2.1) via ordinary least squares regressions, we can obtain A0 matrix using the
relationship between the covariance matrices ut and et, V = A
−1
0 A
−1′
0 . That is, A0 is
the inverse of the lower triangular Cholesky factor of V .1
All variables that I use in this chapter are quarterly data from the FRED database
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louise for macro-variables and from the
CRSP database for yields data. The state vector includes four types of variables: the
monetary policy instrument, contemporaneous inputs to the feedback rule, the yield
on a zero-coupon bond, and an additional explanatory variable. For the monetary
policy instrument, the federal funds rate (FFt) is used. I assume that the feedback
rule incorporates contemporaneous values of the log of real gross domestic product
(RGDPt), the annualized inflation rate (PCEt) measured as the difference in logs of
the personal consumption expenditure deflator at time t and t− 4, and the log of real
wages (RWt) measured by real compensation per hour in the business sector. Long-
rates (Y Tt) are used in a VAR one at a time with the 1- to 6-month, 1- to 5-year
and 10-year maturity yields.2 The quarterly financial data, the federal funds rate, and
yields, are obtained by calculating 3-month averages of monthly data. Finally, the log of
non-borrowed reserves (NBRt) is used as an additional explanatory variable to measure
the demand for credit in the economy. This variable measures the implementation of
the federal funds rate target through open market operations (Edelberg and Marshall
1996). In summary, the state vector includes six individual variables and the ordering
is given by Xt = [RGDPt, PCEt, RWt, FFt, NBRt, Y Tt]. All variables are de-trended
1This normalization on A0 satisfies the assumption that the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to
the information set of the monetary authority. Moreover, it ensures that the dynamic responses of the
variables in Xt are invariant to the ordering of variables in contemporaneous variables and additional
explanatory variables (CEE 1999).
2A 10-year constant maturity yield is used for the 10-year yield from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
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with the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 in order to see
the responses of deviations from the steady state values. The data go from 1965:Q2 to
2005:Q4 and 6 lags are included in each equation.3
The policy instrument FFt, which is one element of Xt, can be decomposed into a
systematic component (the reaction function) and unforecastable policy shock. That
is,
FFt = f(Ωt) + eg,t (2.3)
where eg,t denotes exogenous policy shock, and Ωt is a set of information available to
the monetary authority at time t that consists of two parts: contemporaneous values
of output, inflation, and real wage, and the entire history of the economy.
According to the theory of the term structure of the interest rates, market expecta-
tions about the future path of short rates induced by policy actions play a central role
in determining long rates. After observing the policy action, the market participants
form expectations about the future path of the short rates and formulate long-term
rates. For this reason, the long-term bond yields come after the policy instrument.
Since the feedback rule is a linear function of contemporaneous variables and lagged
values of all variables in the economy, the policy decision affects reserves and bond
yields contemporaneously and has an effect on the future realizations of all variables.
3I use data from 1965 because the policy instrument that I used here is the federal funds rate and
the early 1960s are viewed as the evolutionary period for the federal funds rate to provide information
concerning future movement in real activity relative to the non-borrowed reserve mix (Choi and Ratti
2004). Moreover, the federal funds rate continuously exceeds the discount rate only after 1965, hence
it acts as the primary instrument of monetary policy thereafter (Fuhrer and Redebusch 2004).
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2.2 Preliminary Analysis of the Data
In this section, I compute the first and the second moments of level data for two sample
periods to obtain preliminary information. The results are summarized in Table 2.1.
Panel A displays those with full sample data range, 1965:Q2-2005:Q4, and panel B
summarizes the moment properties within the Volcker-Greenspan period.
The average yield curve is upward sloping in both sample periods, and the standard
deviations of yields generally decrease as maturity increases. When we look up the
correlation coefficients between inflation and financial data including the federal funds
rate, we can see that the full sample period and the Volcker-Greenspan period are not
much different. The correlation coefficients between inflation and the federal funds rate
are similar across the two sample periods, with 61% in the full sample period and 69%
in the post-Volcker period. The amount of correlation between inflation and short-term
yields is similar, too, and decreases as maturity increases, even though the strength of
correlation between inflation and long yields in the full sample period is much smaller
than in the Volcker-Greenspan period. Specifically, the correlation between inflation
and longest-term yields (10-year) is -62% in the Volcker-Greenspan period, compared
to -45% in the full sample period.
The negative relationship between output and the financial data implies that when
the interest rates increase, output falls. It suggests that the interest rates can be
thought of as investment costs or production costs. The positive relationship between
inflation and the financial data confirms this interpretation that when interest rates
increase, the cost of production increases, hence the price goes up.
The correlations between output and financial data in the full sample period are
smaller than the correlations between inflation and financial data. But in the Volcker-
Greenspan period, the correlations between output and financial data are greater than
the correlation between inflation and financial data. Particularly, the correlation be-
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tween output and longest yield is -92% in the Volcker-Greenspan period and -19% in
the full sample period. From these results, we can conjecture that output and financial
data, including the federal funds rate, are highly positively correlated in the pre-Volcker
period, which is contradictory to the traditional belief that there is a negative relation-
ship between output and interest rate.
Table 2.2 shows the first and the second moment properties of de-trended data. Most
patterns resemble those from the level data. But the correlation coefficient between
output and financial data has a positive sign, which means that if the output gap
increases, then the deviations of yields from their trends also move in the same direction
as the output gap. The correlation of output or inflation with the yields decreases with
maturity in both sample periods. From this table, we can conjecture that the feedback
rule has positive signs for output and inflation gap because of the positive correlation of
the federal funds rate with output and inflation gap, 35% and 47%, respectively in the
full sample period; 46% and 27% in the post-Volcker period. The correlations between
financial data including the federal funds rate remain high relative to other variables.
Specifically, the correlations between the federal funds rate and 1-month yields are 92%
in both periods, but those correlations drop below 70% at 10-year yield in both periods.
2.3 Model Specification Test
In this section, I test the model specification by checking the autocorrelations in the
VAR residuals. Autocorrelation is frequently encountered in models estimated with
time-series data. Since error terms pick up the influences of variables affecting the
dependent variables that have not been included in the model, the persistent effect of
excluded variables causes the OLS estimation to be unbiased but inefficient. Moreover
the standard errors from OLS are estimated in the wrong way (Verbeek 2000). This
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section checks the model specification by testing serial correlation of VAR residuals
using the Lagrange multiplier test explained in Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
We wish to test the null hypothesis that the errors ut in the model equation (2.1)
are serially independent against the alternative that they follow AR(p) process. The
test regression can be expressed as follows
uˆt = Φ˜(L)Xt−1 +
p∑
j=1
ρjuˆt−j + u,t (2.4)
where uˆt is the vector of estimated errors from VAR. The matrix of regressors in the
original VAR equation is added because the lagged dependent variables in the regression
function (2.1) are included in Xt−1. It is known that when the original model includes
lagged dependent variables, the Lagrangian multiplier test should be applied based on
equation (2.4) (Verbeek 2000). A test statistic can be computed as TR2 where R2 is the
uncentered R2 from the OLS regression of uˆt upon their lags uˆt−1 and all explanatory
variables. T denotes the effective number of observations. It has a χ2 distribution with
p degree of freedom under the null hypothesis. That is, if R2 is close to zero, it means
that the lagged residuals are not explaining current residuals.
Figure 2.1 depicts autocorrelation functions for each variable’s residuals from the
VAR estimation over 30 lags. Dotted lines represent ±√T1.96. As shown in the figure,
the autocorrelation functions move within 95% confidence intervals, which implies no
serial correlation could be detected. Table 2.3 shows the serial correlation test results
for each residual when p = 1. The table also reports F -test statistics in comparison
with the χ2 results. F -test statistics for ρ1 = ρ2... = ρp = 0 will have p and T − k − p
degrees of freedom where k is the order of VAR regression. Test results indicate that
when VAR(6) is applied, then there is no first-order serial correlation for all variables.
But as the order of autocorrelation (p) in (2.4) increases, the χ2 test rejects the null
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hypothesis of ρ1 = ρ2... = ρp = 0, in particular, for inflation. When I apply the χ
2 test
using TR2 for test statistics, the null hypothesis of inflation is frequently rejected after
p ≥ 2. On the other hand, F -test states that inflation does not have serial correlation
when the residual equation has less than 5 lags. Overall, we can conclude that the VAR
specification with the 6th order does not bear the autocorrelation.
2.4 Impulse Response Functions
This section discusses the results of impulse responses to a monetary policy shock based
on the identification scheme explained in the previous section. The positive relationship
between interest rates and inflation will be discussed with the full sample period and
two sub-sample periods for concerning the stability of the empirical model.
2.4.1 Full Sample Period
In Figure 2.2, the solid line denotes the impulse responses of state variables to one-
standard deviation exogenous monetary policy shocks for 20 quarters. The dash-dot
lines delineate 95% confidence intervals and the dotted lines depict 68% confidence
intervals. These were computed using a bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure outlined in
CEE (1999) with 1,000 bootstrap Monte Carlo draws. Five-year zero-coupon yields are
used to estimate impulse response functions to the contractionary federal funds rate
shock in Figure 2.2. The responses of variables with different yields are not different
from Figure 2.2.
The upper left panel depicts the output response to a contractionary federal funds
rate shock, and clearly shows the hump-shaped response. Output declines for approx-
imately six quarters with a maximum drop by 0.25%, then tends to rise. The federal
funds rate (FF ) initially rises by approximately 60 basis points, but its response dies
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out before a year and a half. There is a persistent drop in non-borrowed reserves
(NBR). Together with the upward response of the federal funds rate, this result im-
plies that there is a significant liquidity effect in the economy. Real wages show an
insignificant but pro-cyclical response to the monetary policy shock. Its maximum re-
sponse is -0.11% six quarters after the shock, and it recovers the pre-shock level 13
quarters after the shock.
The upper right panel of Figure 1 represents the inflation response to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. Inflation initially rises by 0.06% and tends to go down
six quarters after the shock. When we analyze the monetary policy impact in VARs,
many of these VAR specifications, particularly the ones without a commodity price,
frequently generate the price puzzle which states that the contractionary monetary
policy shock produces a substantial positive response of the aggregate price level for
many periods. The conventional wisdom predicts that the reduction of the volume of
non-borrowed reserves in the bank reduces the spending relying on bank credit. Hence,
aggregate demand and price also must fall.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response functions to a contractionary monetary policy
shock when the state vector includes the commodity price index.4 According to Sims
(1992) and Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), the exclusion of a commodity price can
result in a critical mis-specification of the model because it is important information
to policymakers when policy decisions are made. But, as indicated by the impulse
responses, even though the commodity price index is included in order to catch the
future inflation information of the monetary authority, its statistical performance is
only slightly improved, and the directional change is not observed. Hence, the claim by
Sims (1992), that the mis-specification of the policy rule5 induces the price anomaly, is
4The spot market price index from BEA is used to measure the commodity price index.
5Some studies, such as Hanson (2004), found that the policymaker’s information omitted in the
policy rule should be carefully chosen because not all leading indicators for inflation can resolve the
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hard to replicate.
Moreover, there are alternative explanations of the counter-cyclical movement of
prices such as that made by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). They focus on the test
of the null hypothesis that a firm’s markup is counter-cyclical when it is more financially
constrained with firm level data. They emphasize the role of capital market imperfec-
tions so that tighter liquidity constraints may generate counter-cyclical movement of
prices through markups. That is, the standard model predicts the lower marginal prod-
ucts in the boom implying lower marginal costs and factor prices. Hence the real factor
prices become lower in the boom. On the other hand, capital market imperfections and
a market share model can generate counter-cyclical movement of output prices relative
to factor prices. In periods of lower demand, firms tend to rely more heavily on external
financing as cash flow tends to fall faster than investment needs. Even if firms can raise
future profit by increasing market share as they reduce output price, external financing
firms are less inclined to reduce output price during economic downturns because the
increased probability of liquidation makes them care less about the future. Hence, they
have higher markups in recessions. Because of higher markups of externally financed
firms, an increase in the number of externally financed firms in recessions will make
markups even more counter-cyclical.
Another explanation of the price puzzle is the cost channel theory. When we rec-
ognize the cost channel effect of monetary policy, the co-movements of price and the
federal funds rate are not puzzling. As Barth and Ramey (2001) noticed, the pro-
cyclical response of real wages (RW ) in Figure 2.2 is also the evidence of the dom-
inance of cost channel effect over the demand channel effect. A negative monetary
policy shock leads interest rates to increase. The increased interest rates, in turn, push
puzzle. Furthermore, Giordani (2004) argued that “the commodity price index mitigates the price
puzzle mainly because it contains useful information about the output gap, not because it is a good
predictor of future inflation.” He suggested that the inclusion of a good measure of output gap can
help mitigate the puzzle.
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up the production cost by raising borrowing costs. The initial rise of price response to
the contractionary monetary policy shock reflects the dominance of the cost channel
effect relative to the demand channel effect. If a contractionary monetary policy has an
effect on the economy mainly through a demand channel, output and real wages move
in opposite directions because the decreased aggregate demand reduces output prices.
On the other hand, if a cost channel is dominant, both output and real wages should
fall because the decreased aggregate supply raises output prices. If both channels are
strong enough, the response of the relative price would not move unambiguously in one
direction.
The decrease of credit caused by the contractionary monetary policy shock reduces
the private sector’s demand for goods. The contractionary monetary policy shock also
raises the cost of current and future production because firms need to finance labor
and investments which will be used in the current and future production process with
higher interest costs. Hence, the upward movements of the price and the downward
movements of the output persist for some time. Therefore, the rise in inflation and the
fall in real wages may indicate that the cost channel of monetary policy transmission
dominates the demand channel in the economy.
The direction of long-term yield response in Figure 2.2 is the same as the response
of the federal funds rates FFt, but its effect is weaker than FFt. Figure 2.4 shows the
impulse response functions (IRFs) of all bond yields to monetary policy shocks. Each
window represents a different yield (1- to 6-month, 1- to 5-year, and 10-year) starting
from the upper left corner and proceeding to the bottom right. Each impulse response
function is estimated by replacing Y Tt in the state vector with a different maturity
yield one at a time. The dashed lines delineate 95% confidence intervals. According
to the point estimates, the initial responses of all bond yields are significantly greater
than zero, but the amount of initial responses become smaller as maturity increases.
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These results are similar to those of Edelberg and Marshall’s (1996) study in that the
magnitude of the effect declines at longer maturities.
The initial responses of 4-year and longer-term rates persist for approximately six
quarters, which is slightly longer than the shorter-term bond yields. For example, the
impacts on 1-year bond yield and shorter yields disappear within three quarters at the
5% significance level. This can be interpreted in two ways. One is the asset market
imperfection from Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (ALN 2004). Since the asset
markets could have some frictions, investors tend to pay more money for purchasing
longer-term bonds. ALN considered the existence of transaction cost as an important
factor for the market friction. The other interpretation can be found in the studies
by Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) and Gu¨rkaynak et.al. (2005). They argued that the
change of long-term expectations on the inflation target by the central bank could
affect the movements of long-term interest rates via the Fisher equation. That is, the
movements of longer-term rates depend more on inflation expectations than on the
short rate expectations. Hence both studies assert that the effect on long rates could
remain over a longer horizon.
I will discuss the term structure of interest rates in a separate chapter by examining
the term premium responses implied by long-rate responses to macroeconomic shocks.
Here I examine the impulse responses to an asset market shock which can be thought
of as risk premium shock. Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses of macro variables
to the longest-term (10-year) bond market shock. The risk premium shock does not
significantly affect output and inflation at the 5% significance level. The results are no
different when the long-term yield is ordered before the federal funds rate where the
central bank can be thought to have the asset market information when the policy is
formulated. This simply implies that the market participant fully absorbs the asset
market shock or the market participant can diversify the market risk when they trade
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assets.
The co-movements of interest rates and price indicate that the cost channel effect
dominates the credit channel effect, which suggests that the decrease of credit by the
contractionary monetary policy shock reduces the private sector’s demand for goods and
hence price level. The contractionary monetary policy shock causes the federal funds
rate and long-term interest rates to rise in the way that the expectations hypothesis
predicts. The increased short- and long-term interest rates raise the cost of future
production because firms need to finance investments which will be used in the future
production process. Hence the upward movements of the price level persists for some
time and the output decreases.
2.4.2 Sub-Sample Periods
Next, I examine the extent to which the impulse responses may change over the sample
period. To this end, I split the full sample into the period 1965:Q2 to 1979:Q3 (the
pre-Volcker period) and 1979:Q4 to 2005:Q4 (the Volcker-Greenspan period).
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the impulse responses of six variables to the contractionary
monetary policy shock in the pre-Volcker period and the Volcker-Greenspan period,
respectively. Again, the dashed line intervals and the dotted lines represent 95% and
68% confidence bands with the bootstrap Monte-Carlo procedure, respectively.
The results from the Volcker-Greenspan period are very similar to those from the
full sample period and initial inflation response remains positive four quarters after
the shock, which is shorter than the eight quarters in the full sample period. On the
other hand, the inflation response to the exogenous policy shock with the pre-Volcker
data fluctuates more across the entire forecast horizon than does that of the Volcker-
Greenspan period or the full sample period. Moreover, even if its initial response is
positive, it fluctuates around zero across the entire forecast horizon. Hence the demand
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and cost channel effects are mixed; neither one appears dominant in the pre-Volcker
period. According to Hanson’s (2004) study, a price puzzle is related primarily to the
pre-Volcker sub-sample period and most indicator variables about the future inflation
information cannot resolve the price puzzle for this period. But my preliminary impulse
response analysis finds that, contrary to Hanson’s (2004) results, the demand and
cost channel effect are both strong enough in the pre-Volcker period, and the inflation
response during the Volcker-Greenspan period resembles the full sample response, which
implies that the cost channel effect is dominant in this period.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the responses of yields to the contractionary monetary
policy shock in different sub-sample periods. Those results are very similar to the
full sample responses but the magnitude of the responses become smaller across all
maturities and the persistence of the effects is also shorter than that of the full sample
period. We can even see that the 5-year yields are significant only for the two-quarter
forecast horizon in both sub-sample periods.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of level data
A. Full sample period, 1965:Q2-2005:Q4.
mean std corrl
pit fft nbrt 1mth 1yr 5yr 10yr
yt 8.6932 0.3517 -.4484 -.3227 .9265 -.3276 -.3374 -.2420 -.1900
pit 4.0660 2.6647 .6114 -.4932 .6043 .5711 .4755 .4519
fft 6.6082 3.3079 -.3246 .9779 .9671 .8864 .8525
nbrt 3.2885 0.5279 -.3276 -.3138 -.1906 -.1375
1mth 5.6412 2.6358 .9757 .8958 .8600
1yr 6.4810 2.7731 .9513 .9186
5yr 7.1266 2.4459 .9922
10yr 7.4735 2.4385
B. Volcker-Greenspan period, 1979:Q4-2005:Q4.
mean std corrl
pit fft nbrt 1mth 1yr 5yr 10yr
yt 8.9114 0.2307 -.6182 -.8236 .7324 -.8062 -.8536 -.9105 -.9167
pit 3.2792 2.3396 .6883 -.6556 .6783 .6651 .6238 .6224
fft 6.6837 3.8008 -.8068 .9847 .9798 .9258 .9091
nbrt 3.6252 0.3324 -.7888 -.7963 -.8140 -.8204
1mth 5.6735 3.0824 .9782 .9242 .9027
1yr 6.5662 3.2912 .9692 .9502
5yr 7.4499 2.8784 .9948
10yr 7.8872 2.8208
yt, pit, fft, nbrt, 1mth, 1yr, 5yr, and 10yr represent real output, rate of inflation, federal
funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, 1-month yield, 1-year yield, 5-year yield, and 10-year
yield, respectively. Section A shows the summary statistics of level data from 1965:Q2
to 2005:Q4. Mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients for each variable are
shown in the first, second, and third column, respectively. Section B shows the same
summary statistics with data from 1979:Q4 to 2005:Q4.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of filtered data
A. Full sample period, 1965:Q2-2005:Q4.
mean std corrl
10−12× pit fft nbrt 1mth 1yr 5yr 10yr
yt .115 0.0156 .2909 .3523 -.2000 .3828 .3554 .1044 .0118
pit .121 1.5409 .4670 -.2728 .4630 .4143 .2625 .1921
fft -.001 1.6841 -.4233 .9257 .8993 .7065 .6362
nbrt -.047 0.0596 -.4519 -.4534 -.4392 -.4183
1mth .049 1.2922 .9170 .7257 .6456
1yr .141 1.1997 .8861 .8090
5yr .125 0.8481 .9693
10yr .211 0.8080
B. Volcker-Greenspan period, 1979:Q4-2005:Q4.
mean std corrl
pit fft nbrt 1mth 1yr 5yr 10yr
yt -0.0008 0.0135 .3252 .4616 -.1554 .4441 .4571 .3000 .2251
pit 0.0370 1.3570 .2689 -.1655 .3140 .3052 .2313 .1789
fft 0.1402 1.5633 -.3242 .9236 .9066 .7294 .6921
nbrt -0.0009 0.0696 -.3848 -.3952 -.4317 -.4370
1mth 0.0850 1.3420 .9048 .7371 .6733
1yr 0.0881 1.2684 .9037 .8441
5yr 0.0760 0.9307 .9743
10yr 0.0766 0.9065
Section A shows the summary statistics of filtered data from 1965:Q2 to 2005:Q4.
Mean, standard deviation, and correlation coefficients for each variable are shown in
the first, second, and third column, respectively. Section B shows the same summary
statistics with data from 1979:Q4 to 2005:Q4.
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Table 2.3: Autocorrelation test result: H0 : ρ1 = 0
ρ1 t-stat Prob > |t| TR2 Pval > χ2(1) F -stat Pval > F
yt -0.40762 -1.07138 0.28617 1.49061 0.22212 1.14786 0.28617
pit -0.23201 -0.74327 0.45878 0.74675 0.38751 0.55245 0.45878
wt -0.20131 -0.33436 0.73870 0.24652 0.61954 0.11180 0.73870
fft 0.38106 1.57984 0.11680 3.23812 0.07194 2.49590 0.11680
NBRt 0.65434 1.37346 0.17219 2.49258 0.11438 1.88640 0.17219
rn,t 0.02832 0.09293 0.92611 0.20576 0.65011 0.00864 0.92611
yt, pit, wt, fft, NBRt, and rn,t represent real output, rate of inflation, real wage, federal
funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and long-term interest rate. 5-year yield series are
used for rn,t. The first to third columns present AR(1) coefficients of residuals, their
t-statistics, and their p-values, respectively. The fourth and fifth columns report the χ2
statistics for testing serial correlations and their p-values. The last two columns report
F -statistics and their p-values to test serial correlations.
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Figure 2.1: Autocorrelation functions of VAR residuals I
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Autocorrelation functions of VAR(K) residual in which quarterly series are used. K =
6 is adopted. yt, pit, wt, fft, NBRt, and rn,t represent real output, rate of inflation,
real wages, federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and 5-year yield as a long rate,
respectively. Dotted lines represent ±√T1.96.
26
Figure 2.2: Impulse response functions to the federal funds rate shock
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RGDPt, PCEt, RWt, FFt, NBRt, and Y Tt stand for real output, rate of inflation, real
wages, federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and 5-year yield as a long rate, respectively.
The dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals, and the dotted lines are 68%
confidence intervals using bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between
1965:Q2 and 2005:Q4.
27
Figure 2.3: Impulse response functions to the federal funds rate shock with commodity
price
0 5 10 15 20
−0.5
0
0.5 RGDPt
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
PCEt
0 5 10 15 20
−1
0
1
FFt
0 5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
NBRt
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
RWt
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
YTt
0 5 10 15 20
−2
0
2 PCOMt
RGDPt, PCEt, RWt, FFt, NBRt, Y Tt, and PCOMt stand for real output, rate of infla-
tion, real wages, federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, 5-year yield as a long rate, and
commodity price index, respectively. The dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals,
and the dotted lines are 68% confidence intervals using bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The
sample period is between 1965:Q2 and 2005:Q4.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response functions of yields to the federal funds rate shock
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From the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents the impulse response
functions of 1- to 6-month and 1- to 10-year maturity yields, respectively. The IRFs are
obtained by switching the long-term bond yield, Y Tt, in the state vector with different
maturity yields one at a time. The dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals using
bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between 1965:Q2 and 2005:Q4.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to a term premium shock
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A one standard deviation long-term asset market shock is given. RGDPt, PCEt, RWt,
FFt, NBRt, and Y Tt stand for real output, rate of inflation, real wages, federal funds rate,
non-borrowed reserves, and 5-year yield as a long rate, respectively. The dash-dot lines
represent 95% confidence intervals, and the dotted lines are 68% confidence intervals using
bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between 1965:Q2 and 2005:Q4.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to the federal funds rate shock: pre-Volcker period,
1965:Q2-1979:Q3.
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RGDPt, PCEt, RWt, FFt, NBRt, and Y Tt stand for real output, rate of inflation, real wages,
federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and 5-year yield as a long rate, respectively. The
dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals, and the dotted lines are 68% confidence
intervals using bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between 1965:Q2 and
1979:Q3.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to the federal funds rate shock: Volcker-Greenspan pe-
riod, 1979:Q4-2005:Q4.
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RGDPt, PCEt, RWt, FFt, NBRt, and Y Tt stand for real output, rate of inflation, real wages,
federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and 5-year yield as a long rate, respectively. The
dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals, and the dotted lines are 68% confidence
intervals using bootstrap Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between 1979:Q4 and
2005:Q4.
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Figure 2.8: Impulse responses of yields to the federal funds rate shock: pre-Volcker
period, 1965:Q2-1979:Q3.
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From the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents the impulse responses
of 1- to 6-month and 1- to 10-year maturity yields, respectively. The IRFs are obtained by
switching the long-term bond yield, Y Tt, in the state vector with different maturity yields one
at a time. The dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals using bootstrap Monte-Carlo
draws. The sample period is between 1965:Q2 and 1979:Q3.
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Figure 2.9: Impulse responses of yields to the federal funds rate shock: Volcker-
Greenspan period, 1979:Q4-2005:Q4.
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From the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents the impulse responses
of 1- to 6-month and 1- to 10-year maturity yields, respectively. The IRFs are obtained
by switching the long-term bond yield, Y Tt, in the state vector with different maturity
yields one at a time. The dash-dot lines represent 95% confidence intervals using bootstrap
Monte-Carlo draws. The sample period is between 1979:Q4 and 2005:Q4.
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Chapter 3
The Term Premium Response to
Macroeconomic Shocks
My dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, which will be developed in
the next chapter, incorporates the direct effect of short- and long-term interest rates on
the current and future marginal cost of firms. Since the policy instrument in my model
is a nominal short-term interest rate and the long-term bonds are not redundant assets,
the term structure of interest rates becomes an important monetary policy transmission
channel through which the short-rate monetary policy action has an effect on long rates.
The linearized version of the term structure of interest rates derived in my DSGE model
assumes that the term premium follows an exogenous stochastic white noise process
which implies that the macroeconomic shocks do not affect the term premium, and
the monetary policy shock changes long rates in the direction that the expectations
hypothesis predicts.
The natural question would then be whether the real world data can support
the above relationship between the term premium and the macroeconomic shocks, or
whether the term premium movement with respect to other macroeconomic shocks is
negligible enough to be ignored. To answer this question, this chapter examines the
term premium response implied by the impulse response functions of different maturity
yields to the macroeconomic shocks including the monetary policy shock.
In the next section, I will briefly explain the preliminary information on the yield
curve over the business cycle. In sections 2 and 3, with the method used by Edelberg and
Marshall (1996), I show that the expectations hypothesis does a good job of explaining
the impulse response of different maturity yields to macroeconomic shocks. In section
4, the effects of macro variables on the three factors of the yield curve and on the term
premium will be examined.
3.1 Behavior of the Yield Curve over the Business
Cycle
Figure 3.1 displays the yield curve over the business cycle. For yields data, I used the
CRSP data set from 1965:03 to 2005:12. The yields are 1- to 6-month and 1- to 5-year
maturity yields. The 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate is used for 10-year yield.
The slope is calculated as a difference between 5-year and 1-month zero-coupon bond
yields. The solid line represents the 3-month average slope of yields and the dash-dot
line plots the detrended log real GDP using the HP filter with the quarterly frequency
smoothing parameter of 1600. The vertical dotted lines represent peaks and troughs
announced by NBER.
As Figure 3.1 shows, there exists a negative relationship between the slope of the
yield curve and the output. The correlation coefficient is -0.4347. In particular, the
slope of the yield curve is strictly positive at the bottom of the business cycle. We also
observe a strictly smaller slope at the peak than at the very next trough. According
to Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2004, hereafter APW), the upward-sloping yield curve in
recession is due to the counter-cyclical risk premium on long-term bonds and pro-
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cyclical behavior of short-term bond yields due to the Fed’s effort to stimulate the
economy.
3.2 The Term Premium Response to the Monetary
Policy Shock
By changing the short rate, the monetary policy authority affects the long rates through
the policy transmission path known as the term structure of interest rates. I start with
the following well-known term structure equation, which is also derived in my DSGE
model:
rn,t =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Etr1,t+i + TP
n
t (3.1)
where TP nt denotes the time-varying term premium for n-period bond yield. Equation
(3.1) states that the n-period bond yield, rn,t, is determined as the sum of the average
of expected current and future one-period yields up to n-periods and the time-varying
term premium for the n-period bond. Hence, if a policy shock is transmitted through
changing market expectations on future short rates, then the term premium on long-
term bond yields should not be affected by the policy shock.
We can rewrite (3.1) with respect to the term premium for the n-period maturity
bond as the difference between n-period maturity yield and the average of current and
expected one-period maturity yields up to (n− 1)-periods given by:
TP nt = rn,t −
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Etr1,t+i (3.2)
After taking one-period lead and time t expectation on both sides of (3.2), the expected
value of the time t+1 term premium for the n-period maturity bond can be constructed
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by the difference between the expected value for time t+1 n-period maturity yield and
the average of the expected values for one-period maturity yields from t+1 to t+ n as
follows
EtTP
n
t+1 = Etrn,t+1 −
1
n
n∑
i=1
Etr1,t+i (3.3)
The above equation implies that when the state vector in an empirical VAR model
includes one- and n-period maturity yields, we can compute the time t+1 term premium
response for the n-period maturity bond to the monetary policy shock as the difference
between the time t + 1 impulse response function of n-period maturity yield and the
average of impulse response functions of one-period maturity yield from t+ 1 to t+ n.
So the state vector in this section includes two different maturity yields together, one-
and n-period maturity yields, in order to calculate the impulse response of the term
premium for the n-period maturity bond.
The state vector is given by
Xt = (IPt, pit, rwt, FFt, NBRt, r1,t, rn,t)
′
In order to take a closer look into the dynamics of yields, monthly series are used to
examine the behavior of the yield curve. Also, the impulse response analysis is per-
formed with variables in levels and the VAR includes a constant vector. By estimating
the system on the original data, without transforming the data into stationary form,1
we can avoid a possible distortion about the long-run property in the system (Sims et
al. 1990, Bagliano and Favero 1998), which could result in a faulty estimation of the
term premium because of the contaminated long-horizon information on the short rate.
1Standard ADF tests of a unit root against the alternative of a linear trend and intercept suggest
that a unit root cannot be rejected for all variables. The p-values are above 0.08 for IPt, pit, and FFt.
The p-values for NBRt and rwt are above 0.6. The p-values for all yields are above 0.1 except for a
one-period yield. But the p-value for a one-period yield is still above 0.05.
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The log of industrial production, IPt, is used as a measure of output. The annualized
inflation rate (PCEt) is measured as the difference in logs of the chain-type price index
for personal consumption expenditure at time t and t − 12. Monthly real wages rwt
are measured by the interpolation of the log of quarterly real compensation per hour
in the business sector. FFt represents the federal funds rate and NBRt denotes the
log of non-borrowed reserves. Two zero-coupon bond yields, the 1-month yield, r1,t,
and the n-month yield, rn,t, n ≥ 2, are included in the state vector to estimate the
term premium response for the n-period bond. Only rn,t will be replaced with different
maturity yields one at a time. The same yields data as in Chapter 2 are used. Since,
after observing the policy action, market participants form expectations of the future
path of the short rates, the long bond yields are placed after the policy variable.
As in the previous chapter, the serial correlation of VAR residuals is tested based
on the Lagrange multiplier test. rn,t represents the 5-year maturity bond yield. Figure
3.2 depicts autocorrelation functions for each variable’s residuals from the 14th-order
VAR estimation over 30 lags. Dotted lines represent ±√T1.96. As shown in the figure,
the autocorrelation functions move around 95% confidence intervals, which implies no
serial correlation could be detected.
Section A of Table 3.1 reports the first-order serial correlation test results for each
residual. Again, F -statistics are reported in comparison with the χ2-test results. χ2-
and F -test results shows that the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be
rejected under the 1% significance level. The 1% critical value for a χ2 with one degree
of freedom is 6.63490. But the test statistics TR2 for each residual are strictly less than
the critical value. Moreover, F -statistics reveal that the autocorrelation parameters
are statistically zero under the 5% significance level. These results of no first-order
autocorrelation remain the same when the 5-year rates are replaced with other maturity
yields.
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However, when I increase the number of AR coefficients in the residuals, r1,t fre-
quently rejects the null of no autocorrelation, while other variables have no higher-order
serial correlations. Section B of Table 3.1 reports the second-order autocorrelation test
results for the r1,t series in the VAR, replacing rn,t with different maturity yields. The
null of no autocorrelation for r1,t, H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, is frequently rejected when a
yield shorter than 1-year maturity is used for rn,t. Overall, we can conclude that the
residuals from VAR(14) do not have serial correlations when the yields longer than
1-year maturity are used for rn,t. Therefore, I assume that the state vector follows a
14th-order VAR.
Before looking into the term premium response to monetary policy shocks, it will be
useful to see the response of different maturity yields to monetary policy shocks. Figure
3.3 displays the impulse response functions of different maturity yields, 1 to 6 months,
1 to 5 years and 10 years, proceeding from the upper left corner to the lower right. The
1-month yield response in this figure comes from the results of a VAR with the 10-year
yield. But the magnitude and the speed of returning to their pre-shock level of impulse
response functions when using other yields for rn,t are similar to this figure. The dashed
lines delineate 95% confidence interval bands. The confidence intervals are calculated
from the 500 bootstrap Monte Carlo draws.2 According to the point estimates, the
initial responses of all bond yields to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock
are significantly greater than zero, but the amount of initial response becomes smaller
as the maturity increases. For example, the maximal response of the 1-month and
10-year yields to contractionary monetary policy shocks are 27.9 and 4.5 basis points,
respectively.
Equation (3.1) implies that if the expectations hypothesis of the term structure
2In each loop, I calculate the term premium response for n-period bond using equation (3.3). After
finishing 500 loops, I report the 487th highest value and the 13th lowest value of the term premium
response for n-period bond for 95% confidence intervals.
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holds, then the term premium response should be zero. Therefore, the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure predicts the first-step response of rn,t to the monetary
policy shock should be equal to the average of one to n-step responses of r1,t to the
monetary policy shock. That is, from equation (3.3), the first step response of the term
premium for n period bond should be zero statistically. Figure 3.4 plots the first step
response of the term premium for all maturity bonds to the monetary policy shock
calculated from equation (3.3). The confidence intervals are calculated from the 500
bootstrap Monte Carlo draws. According to Figure 3.4, the expectations hypothesis
works well in explaining the pattern of impulse responses of yields to the monetary
policy shock.3 The difference between the first-step response of the long rates, Etrn,t+1,
and the response predicted by the expectations hypothesis, 1
n
Et
∑n
i=1 r1,t+i, is less than 4
basis points across all maturities, and is statistically insignificant at the 5% significance
level.
In order to see the robustness of the results, I check the n(> 1)-step impulse response
functions of the term premium for each maturity yield. Figure 3.5 plots the responses
of the term premium for n-period yields to the contractionary monetary policy shock
up to 20 period horizons. Starting from the upper left corner and proceeding to the
bottom right, each window represents the term premium response for a different yield
(2-6 months and 1-5 years). For maturity yields less than one year, the term premium
responses are slightly positive between 2 and 6 months, but the effects disappear quickly
after 6 months. On the other hand, the term premium responses of yields with longer
than 1-year maturity are statistically insignificant under 95% confidence bands for the
entire horizon. In summary, the monetary policy shock changes different maturity
yields, specifically, long rates move in the direction that the expectations hypothesis
predicts.
3The results are robust to the change of the VAR order from 6 to 12. Also, when the yields are
placed before the policy instrument, the results are not much different.
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3.3 The Term Premium Response to Two
Macroeconomic Shocks
The term premium, in my DSGE model, is assumed to follow an exogenous white noise
process. At the end of the previous chapter, we found that the long-term asset market
shock, which is considered a risk premium shock, does not have a significant effect on
macro variables. Now, it is of interest to check whether the macroeconomic shocks,
other than the monetary policy shock, affect the term premium. This section looks
into the term premium response to two macroeconomic shocks: output and inflation
shocks. I begin with a negative output shock and check the behavior of the term
premium response in order to see whether the term premium responds to the business
cycle movements.
Similar to Figure 3.4, Figure 3.6 displays the first-step response of the term premium
for each maturity bond, EtTPn,t+1, to a one standard deviation output shock. The figure
shows that a negative output shock affects term premia on shorter-term maturity bonds.
Term premia for less than 1-year maturity bonds, specifically, have significant positive
movements at the 5% significance level. On the other hand, the term premium is not
an important determinant for the response of longer-term yields to output shocks. In
general, when a negative output shock is detected, it affects policy decisions, so that
the federal funds rate falls. According to APW (2004), a negative output shock also
affects long bond yields directly by raising the term premium because investors tend to
shun risk in bad times. Therefore, term premia on long bonds are inversely related to
output movements. But this direct effect is statistically negligible for more than 1-year
maturity bonds. The impulse response analysis indicates that the responses of term
premia on longer-term bonds are insignificant at the 5% significance level, and they
move toward zero as maturity increases.
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Figure 3.7 displays the impulse response functions of the term premium for each
maturity bond to one standard deviation negative output shocks up to a 20-month
horizon. Each window shows two to six months and one to five years maturity bond
term premium response starting from upper left corner to the right. Again, dashed
lines represent 95% confidence bands. For all yields, the first 2 to 11 step responses of
the term premium are not statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level.
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 plot the impulse response functions of the term premium to
one standard deviation negative inflation shocks. The two figures display the first- and
multi-step responses of term premia, respectively for different maturity bonds implied
by the impulse responses of yields to negative inflation shocks. Figure 3.8 shows that
when a negative inflation shock is detected, the first-step term premium responses tend
to rise. For example, term premia for more than 1-year maturity bonds are significantly
greater than zero at the 5% significance level. But, for all maturity bonds, the term
premium responses are insignificant at the 1% significance level. In Figure 3.9, we find
that the term premium responses for short-term bonds less than 1-year are statistically
zero across all time horizons, and that the effects of the first-step responses of term
premia for longer-term maturity bonds over 1 year disappear quickly. For example, the
positive effects of negative inflation shocks on term premia for those bonds last at best
5 months and die out to zero after 6 months at the 5% significance level.
Since it is believed that inflation falls in the economic downturn and rises in the
peak, the positive response of the term premium to a negative inflation shock can
be interpreted as an element of the counter-business-cyclical movement of the term
premium. But even though the positive responses of the term premia on long bonds
are significant at the 5% level, the counter-cyclical response of the term premium is not
significant at the 1% level, as shown in Figure 3.8.
Overall, we can conclude that a monetary policy shock has an effect on the econ-
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omy through the expectations hypothesis without disturbing the bond market premium.
Furthermore, negative output and inflation shocks change the term premium in a direc-
tion counter to the business cycle, but their effects are marginal and quickly disappear.
This conclusion partially confirms Evans and Marshall’s (2002) result that long rates
are mostly affected by the change of the expectation path of short rates when monetary
policy shocks are given, and that supply shocks can directly affect long-term yields by
changing term premia. Therefore, the above results support the assumption used in
my DSGE model that macroeconomic shocks do not affect the term premium.
3.4 Response of Three Factors of Yield Curve to
Macroeconomic Shocks
This section investigates the effect of macro variables on the three factors of the yield
curve−level, slope, and curvature−based on the studies by Evans and Marshall (2002)
and Ang and Piazzesi (2003). It is of interest to check the response of the yield curve
to macroeconomic shocks because empirical studies such as Dai and Singleton (2000)
reveal that the greater part of the movements of bond yields is captured by these three
factors. In a later chapter, the model-based impulse response functions of these three
factors of the yield curve will be compared to their empirical counterparts estimated in
this section.
In order to calculate these three factors of the yield curve, I use three different
maturity yields together in the state vector from the previous VAR system. The state
vector consists of two types of variables in the empirical VAR model. The first type is
macro variables which include output, inflation, real wages, the federal funds rate, and
non-borrowed reserves. I use the same data set as in the previous section for macro
variables. The second type is three different maturity yields which represent short-,
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medium-, and long-term yields. I use the 1-month, 12-month, and 60-month yields
used in Evans and Marshall (2002) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003). The state vector is
given by
Xt = (IPt, pit, rwt, FFt, NBRt, r1,t, r12,t, r60,t)
′
In order to measure the three factors of the yield curve, I use Ang and Piazzesi’s
(2003) definitions. That is, the level of the yield curve is calculated as an equally
weighted average of the 1-month, 12-month, and 60-month yields. The difference be-
tween the 60-month yield and the 1-month yield is used for measuring the slope of the
yield curve. The measure of curvature is the sum of the 1-month and 60-month yields
minus twice that of the 12-month yield. Again, the term premium for an n-period
maturity bond is defined as in equation (3.2).
In Figure 3.10, the impulse response functions of three yields to different macroeco-
nomic shocks are shown in the top three rows. Rows 4 to 6 display the responses of three
factors of the yield curve, and the last two rows show the impulse response functions of
the term premium for the 12-month and 60-month bonds to different macroeconomic
shocks. For each window, the dash-dot lines represent the 95% confidence bands from
500 bootstrap Monte Carlo draws.
The positive output and inflation shocks shift all three yields upwards. The maximal
responses of the 1-month, 1-year, and 5-year yields to one standard deviation output
shocks are 32.5, 35.0, and 23.1 basis points, respectively. The corresponding maximal
responses of the yields to the inflation shocks are 19.9, 19.5, and 17.8 basis points, which
are similar to Evans and Marshall’s (2002) result. The parallel responses of yields shift
the level of the yield curve upwards. On the other hand, the slope and curvature
respond little to the output and inflation shocks showing that the confidence bands
roughly include the zero line. According to APW (2004) and equation (3.1), the term
premium and the average expectation path of short rates have different directions in
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recession, hence long-term yields could rise or fall at the bottom of the business cycle.
Even if they decrease, the amount of long-term yield movement shouldn’t be bigger
than the amount of short-rate fall induced by the policy action because of the positive
term premium. Hence, the positive slope of the yield curve is observed in recessions.
But, in Figure 3.10, the evidence of the counter-cyclical response of the slope to the
output shock is significant at the 5% level.
According to the last two rows of Figure 3.10, the (positive) output shock induces a
decrease in the 5-year term premium for the initial period, with a subsequent increase
after 1 year. But the initial decrease of the term premium is insignificant at the 5% level.
Similar results can be seen for inflation shocks. The decrease of the term premium from
the inflation shock lasts longer than the response to the output shock, but its effect is
insignificant at the 5% level. The term premium response for a 1-year bond to output
and inflation shocks show a similar pattern to that of the 5-year maturity bond term
premium. But their effects are insignificant across all periods, except for the first-period
term premium response to the output shock. Hence, the counter-cyclical response of
the term premium seems to be weak.
The positive federal funds rate shock induces an upward shift in the level of the yield
curve and reduces the slope. But those effects disappear within a year. The effect on the
curvature is again insignificant at the 5% significance level. The term premium response
of the 1-year bond is positive but dies out quickly, and the 5-year term premium
response is also positive but statistically insignificant at the 5% significance level.
Overall, the results of this section support the conclusion of the previous section.
The monetary policy action affects the economy in the way that the expectations hy-
pothesis predicts. Output and inflation shocks induce changes in the term premium
only in the first few months, but their effects are insignificant or marginal.
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3.5 Summary of Results
My dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model assumes that the term premium is
an exogenous stochastic white noise process with no relation to other macroeconomic
shocks. This assumption implies that the macroeconomic shocks including monetary
policy shock do not affect the term premium. This chapter dealt with the question of
whether this assumption is broadly consistent with the real data.
In the VAR model with two different maturity yields, the term premium does not
show statistically non-zero responses to monetary policy shocks. Moreover, even if
we observed the counter-cyclical responses of the term premium to the output and
inflation shocks, their effects are marginal at the 5% significance level, but statistically
insignificant at the 1% significance level.
When I used three different maturity yields in the VAR model, the 1-year maturity
term premium shows the positive response to the contractionary federal funds rate
shock, but its effect is marginal and disappears quickly. Moreover, the 5-year maturity
term premium did not generate any significant response to the monetary policy shock
for the entire horizon. The output and inflation shocks also do not have much effect on
the term premium. Even though there are some effects, they are marginal and die out
quickly. There is a substantial response of the yield curve only to the monetary policy
shock. The positive response of the level of the yield curve and the negative response
of the slope to the contractionary monetary policy shock are observed for less than 10
months.
From these two impulse response analyses, we can conclude that the macroeconomic
shocks do not have significant and sustained effects on the term premium. Moreover,
monetary policy affects the long-term interest rate as the expectations hypothesis of
the term structure predicts.
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Table 3.1: Autocorrelation test result
A. H0 : ρ1 = 0 : Model with 5-year yield for rn,t
ρ1 TR
2 Pval > χ
2(1) F -stat Pval > F
yt -0.00030 4.71769 0.02985 3.75327 0.05345
(-0.29743)
pit -0.00000 2.70558 0.10000 2.09074 0.14903
(-0.01200)
rt 0.00006 0.36665 0.54484 0.23275 0.62978
(0.04706)
fft 0.00856 0.36298 0.54685 0.28218 0.59559
(0.12367)
NBRt -0.00032 0.01349 0.90753 0.00996 0.92057
(-0.06139)
r1,t -0.01353 1.95499 0.16205 1.54941 0.21400
(-0.13775)
rn,t -0.02093 1.41531 0.23418 1.11992 0.29062
(-0.33518)
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Table 3.1 Autocorrelation test result : continued.
B. H0 : ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 : Models with different yields for rn,t
Model ρ1 ρ2 TR
2 Pval > χ
2(2) F -stat Pval > F
r2m,t 0.11335 -0.06189 17.51551 0.00016 7.14241 0.00090
(0.86111) (-0.24149)
r3m,t 0.18637 -0.04874 16.39060 0.00028 6.67298 0.00142
(1.37957) (-0.16392)
r4m,t 0.02364 -0.23256 16.21854 0.00030 6.60134 0.00152
(0.16507) (-0.77454)
r5m,t 0.04875 -0.26879 11.97884 0.00251 4.83242 0.00847
(0.34344) (-0.94649)
r6m,t 0.01378 -0.40837 12.81463 0.00165 5.18118 0.00603
(0.20933) (-1.61327)
r1y,t -0.02302 -0.20090 1.65084 0.43805 0.64981 0.52273
(-0.19390) (-0.70091)
r2y,t -0.02338 -0.37475 3.16202 0.20577 1.25155 0.28726
(-0.21409) (-1.22407)
r3y,t -0.01062 -0.32978 2.58730 0.27427 1.02262 0.36066
(-0.10269) (-1.15967)
r4y,t 0.01304 -0.33474 3.13382 0.20869 1.24118 0.29023
(0.13423) (-1.08326)
r5y,t 0.02691 -0.35018 3.42247 0.18064 1.35556 0.25907
(0.25539) (-1.17395)
The numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics. Section A tests the first-order au-
tocorrelation for the model in which a 5-year maturity yield is used for rn,t. The first
column represents AR(1) coefficients of residuals. The second and fourth columns rep-
resent the Lagrange multiplier test statistics and F -statistics, respectively. The third
and fifth columns report there p-values. yt, pit, wt, fft, NBRt, r1,t, and rn,t represent
real output, rate of inflation, real wages, federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves,
one-period bond yield, and 5-year bond yield, respectively. Section B reports the test
results of the first- and second-order serial correlation jointly for r1,t residual, replacing
different bond yields for rn,t. The first row represents the test results for r1,t residual,
in which r2,t is used for the long rate. r2m,t to r6m,t represent two- to six-period bond
yields, and r1y,t to r5y,t stand for 1- to 5-year bond yields, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Slope of yields over the business cycle
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Solid line represents the 3-month average slope of yields calculated as the difference between
the 5-year rate and the 1-month rate, and the dash-dot line (RBC) is the detrended log of real
GDP using the HP filter with the quarterly frequency smoothing parameter of 1600. Vertical
dotted lines represent peaks and troughs announced by NBER.
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Figure 3.2: Autocorrelation functions of VAR residuals II
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Autocorrelation functions of VAR(K) residuals in which monthly series are used. K =
14 is adopted. yt, pit, wt, fft, NBRt, and rn,t represent real output, rate of inflation,
real wages, federal funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, 1-period yield, and 5-year yield
as a long rate, respectively. Dotted lines represent ±√T1.96.
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Figure 3.3: Yield response to the contractionary federal funds rate shock
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Solid lines are the response of yields to the one standard deviation contractionary federal
funds rate shock. Yields are 1- to 6-month, 1- to 5-year, and 10-year yields starting from the
upper left corner to the bottom right. The impulse response of 1-month yield in this figure
comes from the results of the VAR with 5-year yield. The dotted lines plot 95% confidence
bands with 500 bootstrap Monte Carlo draws.
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Figure 3.4: The first-step term premium responses for all maturity yields to the con-
tractionary monetary policy shock
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The X-axis represents the maturity(n) of yields. The solid line plots the estimated first-
step response of the term premium with maturity n, EtTPnt+1, which is constructed as the
difference between the first-step response of n-period yield and the average of one-period yield
responses from t+1 to t+n. Dash-dotted lines and dotted lines display 95 and 99% confidence
bands, respectively.
53
Figure 3.5: Term premium response to the federal funds rate shock for each maturity
yield.
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Starting from the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents term premium
responses to the contractionary monetary policy shock up to 20 months after the shock for
2- to 6-month and 1- to 5-year yields, respectively. The dash-dotted lines plot 95 percent
confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.6: The first-step responses of the term premium for different maturity bonds
to the negative output shock
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The X-axis represents the maturity(n) of yields. The dotted line with stars plots the estimated
first-step response of the term premium with maturity n, EtTPnt+1, which is constructed as
the difference between the first-step response of n-period yield and the average of one-period
yield responses from t + 1 to t + n. Dash-dotted lines and dotted lines plot 95 and 99%
confidence bands, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Term premium response to the negative output shock for each maturity
yield.
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Starting from the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents term premium
responses to the contractionary monetary policy shock up to 20 periods for 2- to 6-month
and 1- to 5-year yields, respectively. The dash-dotted lines plot 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.8: The first-step responses of the term premium for different maturity bonds
to the negative inflation shock
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The X-axis represents the maturity(n) of yields. The solid line plots the estimated first-
step impulse response functions of the term premium with maturity n, EtTPnt+1, which is
constructed as the difference between the first-step response of n-period yield and the average
of one-period yield responses from t+ 1 to t+ n. Dash-dotted lines and dotted lines plot 95
and 99% confidence bands, respectively.
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Figure 3.9: Term premium response to the negative inflation shock for each maturity
yield.
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Starting from the upper left corner to the bottom right, each window represents term premium
responses to the contractionary monetary policy shock up to 20 periods for 2- to 6-month
and 1- to 5-year yields, respectively. The dotted lines plot 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3.10: Effects of the macroeconomic shocks on the yield curve
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Positive one standard deviation shocks are given for the first and second column(output and
inflation shocks). A one standard deviation of contractionary federal funds rate shock is given
for the last column. Dash-dot lines plot 95% confidence bands. The first three rows plot the
impulse response functions of 1-month, 1-year, and 5-year yields, respectively. The fourth to
sixth rows represent the impulse response functions of the level, slope, and curvature of the
yield curve. The last two rows represent the impulse response functions of the term premium
for 1- and 5-year bonds.
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Chapter 4
The Model Economy and Policy
Simulation
The empirical VAR analyses in the previous chapters suggest that a contractionary
monetary policy shock generates the following results
• There are protracted rises in inflation and persistent drops in real wages, which
suggest the existence of a cost channel effect.
• Output shows a hump-shaped response.
• The term premium response to the policy shock does not help much to explain the
long-rate response, which suggests that the monetary policy shock is transmitted
to the economy by changing the expectations of the current and future path of
short rates.
This chapter derives a DSGE model which incorporates these empirical findings.
In particular, the direct relationship between interest rates and production costs is
considered to explain the co-movements of interest rates and inflation. The decisions
which are encountered by each economic agent will be discussed. This includes optimal
allocation of wealth by households and optimal choice of factor inputs and output
prices by firms. In addition, the model economy includes the behavior of financial
intermediaries and the monetary authority.
The model economy, after log-linearizing non-linear equations, will be solved with
Klein’s algorithm. The policy simulation exercises will be carried out based on the
model economy and the results will be compared to the empirical counterparts. The
role of nominal rigidities in explaining the persistent behavior of the economy will also
be discussed in comparison to the role of time-to-build lags and the long-term loan
market.
4.1 The Model Economy
4.1.1 Households
Time Schedule of Households
The household h is indexed on the unit interval. The household supplies a differentiated
labor service Nh,t. It begins time t economic activity with money balance Mh,t−1 from
period t− 1. At the beginning of period t, the asset market opens first. After the asset
market closes then the goods market opens. Before observing the economy-wide shocks
(monetary policy shock and technology shock), the representative household splits up
the money balance held at the beginning of period t into two parts, Hh,t and Qh,t, where
Hh,t goes to the financial intermediary for trading bonds and Qh,t goes to the goods
market for purchasing goods. Hence the money allocation equation of the household
at the beginning of period t is given by Mh,t−1 = Hh,t +Qh,t.
I follow Svensson’s (1985) timing of economic transactions in that cash is set aside for
purchasing goods before the current state of the economy is known to the representative
household. Hence, after determining the amount of Qh,t dollars to finance goods, the
representative household brings its remaining assets, Mh,t−1 − Qh,t, to the financial
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market for purchasing financial assets. But, after observing economy-wide shocks, the
household rearranges its cash position and portfolio of bonds. For analytical simplicity,
I assume that there exist only one- and two-period discount bonds in the financial asset
market. Moreover the household is assumed to hold bonds until they are matured, and
bonds are always redeemed at the end of their maturity dates. Hence one-period bonds
purchased in period t and two-period bonds from period t− 1 will be redeemed at the
end of the period t.
I allow an exogenous stochastic process of transaction costs for long-term bonds, εt
with a mean value ε∗. So the household pays 1+ εt instead of 1 for each dollar of long-
term bond in period t. This reflects the existence of imperfect substitution between
different financial assets. Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (ALN 2004) introduce two
types of frictions in the asset markets: time-varying stochastic transaction costs in the
long-bond market and endogenous transaction costs involving liquidity risk in the long-
bond market to create an extra channel of monetary policy. Because the endogenous
factor could be affected by the policy action, it becomes another channel of monetary
policy other than changing market expectations in the term structure of interest rates.
By introducing stochastic transaction costs in the model, we can have a more general
version of the term structure even after linearizing the model equations. However, the
empirical impulse response functions in the previous chapter (see Figure 2.5) imply that
the long-term asset market shock, which can be interpreted as the term premium shock,
does not affect the variables other than the long-term interest rates. Also, the empirical
analysis in Chapter 3 indicated that macroeconomic shocks do not have a significant
effect on the term premium. In order to take into account the lack of a relationship
between macro shocks and the term premium in the model, I posit that the stochastic
transaction costs for long-term bonds εt follow i.i.d., a white noise process which implies
that macroeconomic shocks do not affect the term premium. This assumption ensures
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that the monetary policy shock changes long rates in the direction that the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure predicts in the linearized version of the economy.
Denote Bh1,t and B
h
2,t as the amount of zero-coupon bonds purchased by household
h which are redeemed for one unit of money under every state of nature at the end of
time t and t + 1, respectively. Define q1,t and q2,t as the discounted prices of one- and
two-period bonds. Then, the portfolio constraint is given by
q1,tB
h
1,t + (1 + εt)q2,tB
h
2,t ≤Mh,t−1 −Qh,t (4.1)
The right hand side of (4.1) is the money wealth carried over from period t − 1 net
of cash set aside for purchasing goods. The portfolio constraint (4.1) tells us that the
amount of money in used for purchasing one- and two-period bonds and the cash set
aside for purchasing consumption goods should not exceed the money wealth from t−1.
Moreover, as we will see later in this chapter, the portfolio constraint is binding when
the price of one-period bonds is less than one. That is, the household sells its remaining
money holdings (Hh,t, net of money holdings for purchasing consumption goods) into
the financial market as long as the nominal short rate is positive.
The suppliers of one- and two-period bonds are financial intermediaries. The mon-
etary authority also participates in the short-term bond market in order to achieve its
policy goal by selling or purchasing one-period bonds. Let Bc1,t denote the amount of
net supply of one-period bonds by the monetary authority, then the negative value of
Bc1,t implies net purchase by the monetary authority. Define B1,t as the amount of one-
period bonds supplied by financial intermediaries. Then the total supply of one-period
bonds becomes B1,t +B
c
1,t.
Capital goods in our economy are long-term capital goods in the sense that it takes
many periods to construct them. While many studies assume that households invest
their wealth for maintaining the capital goods against depreciation and rent them to
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firms, the investment for capital goods is carried out by firms in my model.
During the time when asset trading markets are open, the state of the economy
is revealed.1 Having observed shocks in the economy, the household h makes its con-
sumption decision and nominal wage contract with the full information on the current
state of the economy. The household purchases consumption goods ct with its time−t
cash holdings plus labor income from the production sector. Wage bills are pre-paid in
money that can be used to purchase consumption goods. Therefore, the cash-in-advance
constraint is given by
Ptch,t ≤ Qh,t +Wh,tNh,t (4.2)
where Pt and Wh,t denote the price level of consumption goods and nominal wages,
respectively.
Each household owns the same portion of claims on profits from period t economic
activities of firms and financial intermediaries, and a market for claims to those profits
is assumed not to exist in the economy for simplicity’s sake. Hence, at the end of
period t, after closing the goods market, household h, the owner of firms and financial
intermediaries, receives the equally divided portion of aggregate profits Πh,t from firms
and DIVh,t from financial intermediaries as dividends.
Financial intermediaries redeem all maturity bonds B1,t and B2,t−1 at the end of
period t. When the monetary authority sells one-period bonds, household h also re-
ceives Bc,h1,t from the monetary authority, where B
c
1,t =
∫ 1
0
Bc,h1,t dh. Even if we assume
that bonds purchased at the period t market are redeemed at the beginning of the ma-
turity date, the results are the same as the following schedule where one-period bonds
purchased in the period t asset market and two-period bonds purchased in t− 1 period
asset market are paid out at the end of period t. We do not lose generality because,
1The asset market shock is assumed to be observed during the time when asset markets are open.
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for both schedules, each household knows with certainty the amount of payoffs Bh1,t
and Bh2,t−1 from period t and t − 1 bond markets, and they do not affect the period t
consumption decision. That is, getting payoff at the end of period t or at the beginning
of period t+1 does not affect the period t CIA constraint because time t consumption
is restricted not to be a function of payoffs Bh1,t + B
h
2,t−1 at the end of period t, nor at
the beginning of period t + 1. Rather, those payoffs, Bh1,t + B
h
2,t−1, affect time t + 1
consumption decisions via next-period portfolio constraint.
The household h allocates the remaining wealth to the money balances, Mt to
purchase period t+1 assets and goods. The end of period t money balance is given by
Mh,t = Πh,t +DIVh,t +B
h
1,t +B
h
2,t−1 +Qh,t +Wh,tNh,t − Ptch,t + Th,t (4.3)
where Th,t = Ptτh,t denotes nominal lump-sum money transfer made to the household
h from the monetary authority. If it is negative, Th,t is lump-sum tax to the monetary
authority.
Let n be a term from time t to the maturity date t+n. The nominal interest rates will
appear in our economy through the relation to bond prices qn,t = e
−nin,t . The condition
states that the price of bonds is a discounted value of one dollar with a constant rate
to the maturity date. A discrete version of this equation is qn,t = (1 + in,t)
−n, and the
two expressions lead us to the following equation
in,t = − 1
n
lnqn,t (4.4)
The Wage Decision
As in Erceg et al. (2000), the monopolistically competitive household supplies its
labor service and nominal wages are assumed to be determined in staggered contracts.
Household wage-decision behavior enables real wages to move in the direction that the
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cost channel effect predicts in my model. The household sells a differentiated labor
service, Nh,t, to a representative firm that transforms this service into aggregate labor
input, Nt, with the following Dixit-Stigliz technology:
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
N
θn−1
θn
h,t dh
] θn
θn−1
(4.5)
where θn > 1. This firm minimizes the cost of producing Nt given the nominal wage
rate Wh,t and sells the aggregate labor to the intermediate goods-producing firms with
aggregate wage rate Wt, which is defined as
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
W 1−θnh,t dh
] 1
1−θn
(4.6)
Then, the total demand for the household h’s labor service by the production sector is
given by
Nh,t =
(
Wh,t
Wt
)−θn
Nt (4.7)
Households set their wage according to a variant of firms’ Calvo-type price-setting.
A constant fraction (1 − ωn) of households re-optimizes the nominal wage, and ωn of
them simply set their wage based on past inflation times their past wages as follows
Wh,t = pit−1Wh,t−1 (4.8)
where inflation is defined as pit =
Pt
Pt−1
throughout this paper. Therefore, when house-
hold h has not re-optimized since time t, its wage in period t + j becomes Wh,t+j =
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pijWh,t, where
pij = {
pit × pit+1 × · · · × pit+j−1 if j ≥ 1
1 if j = 0
(4.9)
Optimization
Under the constraints (4.1) through (4.3) and taking Nt and Wt as given, household h
decides on the amount of bonds, consumption demand, nominal wage rate, and demand
for money to maximize its time t expected utility function given by
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjU(ch,t+j, Zh,t+j, Nh,t+j; νt+j) (4.10)
where β denotes a time discount factor satisfying β ∈ (0, 1), and νt is a preference shock
which follows an AR(1) process with white noise ν,t ∼ (0, σν) given by
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + ν,t (4.11)
Zh,t represents the habit formation reference consumption level of household h. I assume
the second-order habit persistence which implies that the reference consumption level
depends on the weighted average of the past two periods’ consumption levels:
Zh,t = ρcch,t−1 + (1− ρc)ch,t−2
As the memory parameter converges to unity, ρc → 1, only the last period’s consump-
tion is important.
Define η > 0 and ψ > 0 as the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply (with respect
to real wages) and the labor (leisure) share or scale parameter in the utility, respectively.
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Then, the period utility function of this household is given by
U(ch,t, Zh,t, Nh,t; νt) =
νt
1− σ
(
ch,t
Zζh,t
)1−σ
− ψN
1+η
h,t
1 + η
(4.12)
where σ denotes the inverse of elasticity of the intertemporal substitution with respect
to consumption. The habit persistence parameter is restricted to be 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1. ζ > 1
is not allowed because of negative steady state marginal utility of consumption. If
ζ = 1, the relative consumption to the reference level of consumption matters to this
household. σ is restricted to be greater than one if ζ 6= 0, and σ > 0 if ζ = 0 in order
for the marginal utility of Zt to be positive.
Denote Λa, Λb, and Λc as Lagrangian multipliers for (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), respec-
tively. Then, the first-order conditions are given by
(a) ct : Uc,t = Pt(Λ
b
t + Λ
c
t)
(b) Wh,t : Et
∑∞
j=0(ωnβ)
j{1−θn
θn
pijWh,t(Λ
b
t+j + Λ
c
t+j)− UNh,t+j}Nh,t+j = 0
(c) BH1,t : Λ
c
t = q1,tΛ
a
t
(d) B2,t : βEtΛ
c
t+1 = (1 + εt)q2,tΛ
a
t
(e) Mt : βEtΛ
a
t+1 = Λ
c
t
(f) Qt : Λ
a
t = Λ
b
t + Λ
c
t
where the marginal utility of consumption is defined as
Uc,t = νtZ
−ζ(1−σ)
t c
−σ
t − ζβEtνt+1c1−σt+1 Z−1−ζ(1−σ)t+1 ρc
−ζβ2Etνt+2c1−σt+2 Z−1−ζ(1−σ)t+2 (1− ρc)
(4.13)
From Erceg et al. (2000), Amato and Laubach (2004), and CEE (2005), we know that
the existence of complete state contingent claims markets for consumption ensures
that households have identical consumption in each period. Hence, the omission of a
68
household-specific term in (a) and (c) ∼ (f) reflects the assumption of the existence of
complete state contingent claims markets. From (a) and (b), we obtain the following
consumption-labor-related equation
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ωnβ)
j{1− θn
θn
pijWh,t
Pt+j
Uc,t+j − UNh,t+j}Nh,t+j = 0 (4.14)
Equation (4.14) implies that the household sets its wage so that the discounted marginal
utility of the income from an additional unit of labor is equal to its discounted marginal
disutility from supplying labor (Erceg et al. 2000). It collapses to the familiar condition
that real wages are equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure when all households re-optimize their wages in every period, ωn → 0:
1− θn
θn
Wh,t
Pt
= −UN,t
Uc,t
(4.15)
Using (c), (d), (e), and (f), we obtain the standard asset pricing equations for
discount bonds as follow
(Λbt + Λ
c
t)q1,t = Etβ(Λ
b
t+1 + Λ
c
t+1)
(1 + εt)(Λ
b
t + Λ
c
t)q2,t = Etβ
2(Λbt+2 + Λ
c
t+2)
(4.16)
The above asset pricing equations tell us that, at the optimum, the utility from pur-
chasing one unit of bonds (the left-hand side) must be equal to the discounted expected
utility that the household will be paid out in the next period from those bond holdings
(the right-hand side). With the explicit utility function (4.12), equation (4.16) can be
expressed as the ratio of each period’s marginal utility as follows:
q1,t = βEt
Pt
Pt+1
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
(4.17)
(1 + εt)q2,t = β
2Et
Pt
Pt+2
Uc,t+2
Uc,t
(4.18)
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Equation (4.18) involves a stochastic transaction cost which reflects the existence of
imperfect substitution between different maturity bonds as used in ALN (2004). When
the exogenous transaction cost shock is detected in the long-term bond markets, house-
holds pay more than one dollar for one unit of long-term bond purchases in time t even
though the amount of payoffs from holding these bonds is the same. Hence, the long-
term bond markets face an excess supply, and the price of bonds q2,t falls to recover
the equilibrium state.
The term structure of interest rates can be derived from (4.17) and (4.18). Using
the law of iterated expectation, (4.18) becomes
(1 + εt)q2,t = q1,tEtq1,t+1 + Covt
(
β
Pt
Pt+1
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
, q1,t+1
)
(4.19)
Using the relationship between the bond prices and interest rates, equation (4.4), the
log linearized expression of (4.19), becomes
iˆ2,t =
1
2
iˆ1,t +
1
2
Etiˆ1,t+1 +
1
2
εˆt (4.20)
The two-period interest rate is the average of the current and expected future one-
period interest rates plus stochastic term premium. Since the empirical analyses in
the previous chapters suggested that the term premium is not an important factor
in explaining the long-rate response to macroeconomic shocks, the covariance term is
dropped out in equation (4.20). But even if the covariance term is dropped out of
the equation by the log-linearization, the long rate still involves the stochastic term
premium, which is from imperfect substitution between two different maturity bonds.
From (c) and (f), we get q1,t =
Λct
Λbt+Λ
c
t
, and from (4.4)
r1,t = ln
(
1 +
Λbt
Λct
)
(4.21)
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This equation states that the nominal short rate is non-negative and strictly positive
when the value of liquidity service is positive. The first-order condition (c) for the short-
term bond implies that Λct , the expected marginal utility of the beginning of period t+1
money balance evaluated at t, is equal to the marginal utility of the beginning of period
t money balance evaluated with q1,t. Moreover we can see from (a) that the marginal
utility of consumption exceeds the expected marginal utility of the beginning of period
t+ 1 money balance evaluated at t by the value of liquidity service Λbt .
4.1.2 A Final Good Producing Firm
A final good yt is produced by a representative, perfectly competitive firm using the
following production technology:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
θpi−1
θpi
i,t di
) θpi
θpi−1
(4.22)
where yi,t is an intermediate good produced by intermediate-goods producing firm i ∈
(0, 1). The parameter θpi > 1 is the price elasticity of demand for the individual good
i. The higher θpi implies the closer substitutes between the individual goods. The
final good producing firm maximizes its profit given its output price Pt and input price
Pi,t. The demand for good i is driven by the Euler equation and output price can be
obtained as follows:
yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−θpi
yt (4.23)
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−θpii,t di
) 1
1−θpi
(4.24)
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4.1.3 Intermediate Good Producing Firms
A monopolistically competitive firm i ∈ (0, 1) produces an intermediate good yi,t with
labor and capital inputs. Labor Ni,t is supplied by a representative firm which trans-
forms a differentiated labor service from households into aggregate labor Nt. The labor
cost is financed from financial intermediaries and paid to workers in advance of pro-
duction. Each firm is assumed to own its capital stock. The construction of investment
projects requires multiple periods before they can be used as capital in the production
process. The firms are restricted not to use their own goods. Hence, they purchase in-
vestment goods in the goods market. Each firm also finances these investment projects
from financial intermediaries.
Let Ki,t denote the capital stock of firm i at the beginning of period t. A single firm
uses the following production technology and produces a differentiated good
yi,t = {
ξtN
α
i,tK
(1−α)
i,t − Y¯ if ξtNαi,tK(1−α)i,t ≥ Y¯
0 o.w.
(4.25)
where Y¯ > 0 denotes the fixed cost of production. This CES (Constant Elasticity of
Substitution) technology results in the steady state labor share α, and capital share
1 − α of output. ξt is an economy-wide technology shock with a highly persistent
stochastic process as in many studies of real business cycles,
ln ξt = (1− ρξ) ln ξ + ρξ ln ξt−1 + ξ,t (4.26)
where ξ > 0 and |ρξ| < 1. The serially uncorrelated innovation ξ,t follows an i.i.d.
white noise process with variance σξ.
There exist time lags in the production process between the moment when invest-
ment decisions are made and the moment when the investment projects or machines are
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used in capital. One reason for the time delay in completion of capital stock might be
the requirement of time to design, research, and construct investment projects. Kyd-
land and Prescott’s (1982) time-to-build technology is adopted in order to incorporate
this type of time gap in the model. Let sij,t, j = 1...J denote the number of investment
projects of firm i which require j periods to be completed at time t. For example, in-
vestment projects launched at time t, siJ,t, require J periods in order to be used in the
productive capital stock Ki,t+J , hence in t+ J production. Therefore, s
i
j,t for j = 2...J ,
are not used in the productive capital stock. Hereafter, I assume J = 22 for the sake of
simplicity. Let ϕj for j = 1, 2 denote the fraction of resources allocated in s
i
j,t. Then,
the total investment implemented by firm i in period t becomes ivi,t =
∑2
j=1 ϕjs
i
j,t.
This implies that each firm cannot purchase ϕ1s
i
1,t+1 during period t. The transition
law of productive capital stock is then given by
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Ki,t + si1,t (4.27)
si1,t+1 = s
i
2,t (4.28)
where δ denotes a depreciation rate. Equation (4.27) says that newly launched projects
in period t−1 are used for the productive capital Ki,t+1 hence for time t+1 production.
Equation (4.28) simply states investment projects launched at time t require two periods
to be constructed and, at time t+1, these projects need only one period to be completed.
Since workers must be paid in advance of production, firms need to finance the
wage bill in the loan market at the beginning of time t. Firm i also finances the cost
of long-term investment projects in order to ensure the whole cost of projects. These
financial costs add to production costs. Firms are assumed to use different maturity
of loan contracts for different purposes. Short-term loans are used for the payment of
2We can expand the model in a way that each firm has a different time horizon to complete its
projects and finances the projects with firm-specific n-period loan contracts.
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labor costs in every period, and long-term loans go for covering the cost of long-term
investment projects. The reason that firms match the maturity of debts and the period
of using the factor cost and construction cost can be justified as follows. Firms have
no incentive to borrow money with long-term contracts for financing time t and future
labor costs because of the risk of price change. On the other hand, the construction cost
for investment projects takes two periods to be exhausted and the cost is determined
when the project decisions are made. By borrowing money with a long-term contract
which has the same maturity as construction periods, firms can protect money from
the risk of failing to roll over the maturity and hence failing to complete the project.3
Hence, firms finance investment projects in a way that covers the whole cost of the
projects up to completion. That is, they are not allowed to finance ongoing projects or
periodic investment expenditure on the productive capital, Ptivi,t. Since new projects
require two periods to be constructed, firm i makes 2-period loan contracts. I rule out
entry and exit into the production sector.
Let Ai,t denote the amount of long-term loans by firm i. ϕ2 fraction of the investment
projects will be paid at time t at the time t price, and ϕ1 fraction of them will be charged
at time t + 1 at the time t + 1 price. Since firms cannot observe the time t + 1 price
at time t, the long-term financing process involves firms’ expectations of the time t+1
price. But when the time t long-term financing decision is made, firms can observe the
prediction error from the decision made in time t− 1, ϕ1si2,t−1Pt−ϕ1si2,t−1Et−1Pt ≡ t.
This follows from the assumption that the state of the economy is revealed to all
agents during the period when asset markets are open. So firms can add the difference
3We can consider another borrowing strategy to finance long-term projects other than matching
borrowing periods to construction periods. After 2 construction periods, investment projects produce
positive cash flow for longer periods, say 10 periods whose length depends on the rate of depreciation
of the projects. Firms can make 12-period financing contracts to cover 2 periods of negative cash
flow, which promises paying out the construction costs after the investment projects start producing
positive cash flow. But this strategy requires long lines of interest payment sequence in the firm’s
optimization process, which is burdensome to solve the model. For the sake of simplicity, I adopt a
2-period borrowing strategy in this paper and leave the 12-period contract strategy for a future study.
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between the amount of investment expenditure at time t− 1 and the actual investment
expenditure in the new fund to finance period t investment projects. Therefore, the
borrowing constraint of firm i is given by
Ai,t ≥ ϕ2si2,tPt + ϕ1si1,t+1EtPt+1 + t (4.29)
The long-term borrowing constraint states that the amount of long-term borrowing,
Ai,t, should not be less than the total cost of time t-launched investment projects plus
the error correction amount for ϕ1 fraction of investment projects to be completed
in period t. Now, it is natural to define money holdings by the firm i as M fi,t ≡
ϕ1s
i
2,tEtPt+1. M
f
i,t amount of money will be used in purchasing ϕ1 fraction of s
i
2,t in
the next period. Because of the assumption on the time schedule of the economy, firms
cannot purchase bonds for M fi,t in the period t bond market. Then, the borrowing
constraint for financing long-term projects can be rewritten as follows:
M fi,t ≤ Ai,t − ϕ2si2,tPt − ϕ1si1,tPt +M fi,t−1
which states that the money balance of firm i at the end of time t is determined as a
residual after paying out ϕ2 fraction of time t-launched projects from time t borrowing,
and ϕ1 fraction of time t − 1-launched projects that require one more period to be
completed in period t, from money holdings of previous period M fi,t−1.
Each firm follows a two-step optimization procedure. First, it minimizes its time-
discounted total cost given the output and its price level. Second, it maximizes time-
discounted profit with respect to its price with the cost function and the output price
as given. Given the production function (4.25), productive capital evolution equation
(4.27), (4.28), and the project financing constraint (4.29), the firm chooses its labor
input, production, and investment levels by minimizing its time-discounted expected
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total cost.
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjΛt+jTCi,t+j (4.30)
The periodic total cost of each firm TCi,t consists of two parts: labor and investment
project financing cost minus money holdings for purchasing a fraction of time t launched
projects in the next period. Let Di,t denote the amount of short-term loans by firm i,
and define RN,t and RA,t as the gross rate of interest for short- and long-term loans,
respectively. The amount of short-term loans equals the total wage bill, Di,t = WtNi,t.
The loaned money will be repaid with the gross interest rate RN,t at the end of period
t from time t sales revenue. Hence, time t total borrowing costs to finance labor input
of firm i becomes RN,tWN,tNi,t. It also has to pay out financing costs for the projects
launched at t − 1, RA,t−1Ai,t−1. Then, the total financing costs at the end of time t
become RN,tWN,tNi,t+RA,t−1Ai,t−1 (no coupon interest is assumed), because the money
borrowed with long-term contracts at the beginning of period t − 1 will be redeemed
at the end of period t.4 The periodic total cost will be expressed as
TCi,t ≡ RN,tWtNi,t +RA,t−1Ai,t−1 −M fi,t
Money holdings with a negative sign enter time t total cost because they provide positive
cash flow to the firm as a residual from long-term borrowing and investment payments,
Ai,t−ϕ2si2,tPt−ϕ1si2,t−1Pt+ϕ1si2,t−1Et−1Pt−RA,t−1Ai,t−1 = −RA,t−1Ai,t−1+M fi,t.5 Since
4Even if we adopt the time schedule that a firm pays out its liability at the beginning of period
t+1 instead of at the end of period t, period t+1 production will not be used to pay out the financial
costs which are incurred in period t for short-term loans and in period t − 1 for long-term loans. It
is because a representative firm should pay out its liabilities at the beginning of t+ 1 but the period
t+ 1 sales revenue arrives at the end of the period.
5Money holdings by firms bear no interest earnings because the interest earnings from the asset
market arrive after the goods market is closed. That is, if firm i intends to purchase bonds in the time
t + 1 bond markets for Mfi,t, it cannot purchase the ϕ1 fraction of investment projects ϕ1s
i
1,t+1 for
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firms are owned by households, all economic activities by firms should be evaluated
as the households’ value. Λt is the Lagrangian multiplier on the households’ budget
constraint. It denotes a marginal value of one dollar to the household,6 and from
(e), (f), and (a), it is given by
Λt ≡ Λct = Etβ
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
Since households face a cash-in-advance constraint in the goods market, one dollar to
households in time t from firms will be used in purchasing time t + 1 goods. Hence,
the marginal value of one dollar at the end of period t is associated with time t + 1
marginal utility of consumption.
Let Υt and Φt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the production func-
tion and borrowing constraint. The firm’s cost minimization with respect to Ni,t, Ai,t,
si2,t, and Φt results in four first-order conditions as follows:
(A) Ni,t : RN,tWt = ΥtYN,t
(B) Ai,t : βRA,tΛt+1 = ΛtΦt
(C) si2,t :
ΛtΦtϕ2Pt + ΛtΦtϕ1EtPt+1 + βϕ1Et{Λt+1Φt+1(Pt+1 − EtPt+1)}
−ϕ1ΛtEtPt+1 =
∑∞
j=2 β
j(1− δ)j−2EtΛt+jΥt+jYK,t+j
(D) Φt : At = ϕ2s2,tPt + ϕ1s2,tEtPt+1 + t
Rewriting (A) and combining (B), (C), and (D), we have
WtRN,t = αΥtYN,t (4.31)
βRA,tEtΛt+1(ϕ2Pt + ϕ1EtPt+1) + β
2ϕ1Et{RA,t+1Λt+2 (Pt+1 − EtPt+1)}
−ϕ1ΛtEtPt+1 =
∑∞
j=2 β
j(1− δ)j−2EtΛt+jΥt+jYK,t+j
(4.32)
Mfi,t because all interest-bearing bonds are redeemed at the end of each period after the goods market
is closed.
6This type of discount factor expression is used in many general equilibrium studies, including CEE
(2005), Jung (2004), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and Dotsey and Ireland (1995).
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at = ϕ2s2,t + ϕ1s2,tEtpit+1 + ϕ1s2,t−1 (1− a,t) (4.33)
where a,t =
Et−1Pt
Pt
denotes the amount of time t-realized price prediction error. at =
At
Pt
denotes the real amount of borrowing with long-term contracts, and YN,t and YK,t rep-
resent the marginal product of labor and capital input. The firm-specific subscriptions
are dropped because the equilibrium labor-capital ratio is the same across all firms.
From equation (4.31), it is clear that marginal products of financing labor should be
the same as the marginal costs of financing labor at the optimum. The left-hand side
of (4.32) represents the time t shadow price of new projects (or marginal cost of new
projects) launched at the beginning of time t expressed with the amount of borrow-
ing costs. The negative sign of the last term on the left-hand side (4.32) represents
the marginal benefit from carrying money to the next period. The right-hand side of
condition (4.32) involves the stream of future marginal products of capital because the
factories or machines constructed with new investment projects of time t operate until
the production process stops. More precisely, it is because, from (4.27) and (4.28),
the evolution of time t productive capital can be expressed by the history of the ini-
tial (j = 2) stages of all projects over production periods: Kt =
∑∞
i=2(1 − δ)i−2s2,t−i.
Therefore, (4.32) states that the marginal products of investment projects should equal
the marginal costs of the projects at the optimum. It is clear from equation (4.31) and
(4.32) that the nominal interest rates affect the marginal cost.
Firms are assumed to adjust their prices based on the Calvo-type pricing mechanism.
1− ωpi fraction of all firms re-optimize their price, but the remaining fraction of them
simply set their price as past inflation times previous level of their prices as follows
(CEE 2005):
Pi,t = pit−1Pi,t−1 (4.34)
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The above equation implies that, when firm i does not re-optimize after time t, its price
in the period t + j becomes Pi,t+j = pijPi,t. Let P
∗
t denote the equilibrium price level
chosen by price re-optimizing firms. Then the average price in period t becomes, from
(4.24):
P 1−θpit = (1− ωpi)P ∗(1−θpi)t + ωpi(pit−1Pt−1)1−θpi (4.35)
Then, each firm’s pricing decision involves choosing Pi,t to maximize cash flow
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ωpiβ)
jΛt+j(pijPi,tyi,t+j − TCi,t+j) (4.36)
By using (4.23), (4.31), and (4.32) dropping out the unrelated terms to Pi,t, the above
objective function can be re-arranged as:
Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+j
(
pijPi,t
Pt+j
)1−θpi
yt+j − αEt
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+jφt+j
(
pijPi,t
Pt+j
)−θpi
yt+j
−(1− α)Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
j
∑∞
k=2 β
k(1− δ)k−2λt+j+kφt+j+k
(
pij+kPi,t
Pt+j+k
)−θpi
yt+j+k
sit+j
Ki,t+j+k
where λt = PtΛt denotes the marginal value of Pt units of currency (CEE 2005) and
φt = Υt/Pt is the real marginal cost. The first term in the above objective function
is cash in-flow from the sales revenue. The second term is the fraction of real total
cost due to the labor cost, and the third term is cash out-flow from the investment
expenditure.
The first-order condition is then given by
Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+j(
pij
Pt+j
)1−θpiyt+jP ∗t
= θpi
θpi−1{αEt
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+jφt+j(
pij
Pt+j
)−θpiyt+j
+(1− α)Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
j
∑∞
k=2 β
k(1− δ)k−2λt+j+kφt+j+k( pij+kPt+j+k )−θpiyt+j+k
s2,t+j
Kt+j+k
}
(4.37)
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I assume the symmetric equilibrium so that the firm-specific notation is dropped in
the fraction of
s2,t+j
Kt+j+k
for all j and k. The above equation states that the firm sets
its contract price so that discounted real marginal revenue is equal to discounted real
marginal cost.
4.1.4 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries trade one-period discount bonds with the households and the
monetary authority whose prices are q1,t and two-period bonds with the households
whose price is q2,t. Net amount of funds from households and government is Mt−1 −
Qt − q1,tBc1,t, where Mt =
∫ 1
0
Mh,tdh and Qt =
∫ 1
0
Qh,tdh. The first two terms are from
households, and the other term is net supply of one-period bonds from the monetary
authority. Since equation (4.1) implies Mt−1 − Qt = q1,tBH1,t + (1 + εt)q2,tB2,t, where
BH1,t =
∫ 1
0
Bh1,tdh andB2,t =
∫ 1
0
Bh2,tdh, the amount of funds can be rewritten as q1,t(B
H
1,t−
Bc1,t) + (1 + εt)q2,tB2,t. These funds become the source of the supply of loanable funds.
Financial intermediaries use these funds to make two types of loan contracts with
intermediate goods producing firms: the short-term loan contracts with which firms
finance the wage bill with gross interest rate RN,t, and the long-term loan contracts
with which firms finance the whole cost of new projects launched at time t with gross
interest rate RA,t for two periods. The total demand for loans by firms becomes Dt+At
where Dt =
∫ 1
0
Di,tdi = WtNt, At =
∫ 1
0
Ai,tdi = ϕ2s2,tPt + ϕ1s2,tEtPt+1 + t, and
s2,t =
∫ 1
0
si2,tdi. Then, the resource constraint is given by
Dt + At = q1t(B
H
1,t −Bc1,t) + (1 + εt)q2tB2,t (4.38)
For the sake of simplicity, financial intermediaries are assumed to match maturi-
ties between assets and debts. That is, financial intermediaries use short-term loan
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contracts for lending money to firms with funds from selling short-term bonds, and
they use long-term loan contracts for lending money with funds from selling long-term
bonds. This assumption can be justified from the “matching principle” of the cor-
porate debt maturity theory which is empirically supported in many studies, such as
Emery (2001) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) for U.S. data, and Ozkan (2002) for UK
data, among others. It states that firms should match the maturity of their liabilities
to their asset maturity because if debt maturity is shorter than asset maturity, firms
may not have enough cash on hand to repay the principal at the due date. Moreover,
if the maturity of debt is longer than asset maturity, then cash in-flow from holding
assets stops, while firms still have unpaid debt obligations. By matching maturities,
firms can reduce these risks and expected costs of financial distress (Stohs and Mauer
1996). The matching principle can be applied to financial intermediaries because their
main purpose is to seek profit as private firms do. The loan market separation together
with the perfect competition in the loan markets guarantee that we can identify the
equilibrium amount of short- and long-term borrowings. Now, each resource constraint
becomes
Dt = q1,tB1,t (4.39)
At = (1 + εt)q2,tB2,t (4.40)
where B1,t denotes the supply of one-period bonds by financial intermediaries. The
left-hand sides of (4.39) and (4.40) are the supplies of short- and long-term funds,
respectively, and the right-hand sides represent the sources of funds.
At the end of period t, financial intermediaries receive payoffs (principal plus inter-
est) from the short-term loan contracts made at the beginning of the period and from
the long-term loan contracts made at the beginning of period t− 1. After reimbursing
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all maturing bonds B1,t and B2,t−1 to households (and to the monetary authority if
Bc1,t < 0), financial intermediaries distribute their end-of-period net cash position to
the household as a dividend DIVt given by
DIVt = RN,tDt +RA,t−1At−1 − (B1,t +B2,t−1).
Financial intermediaries maximize the present value of the profit stream subject to
(4.39) and (4.40) with respect to Dt, At, B1,t, and B2,t given the perfect loan market
competition, i.e., given RN,t and RA,t. This can be expressed as
Et
∞∑
j=0
βjΛt+jDIVt+j
Again, the discount factor, Λt, is defined the same way as in the firms’ problem.
The first-order conditions result in the following two equations.
RL,t =
1
q1,t
(4.41)
RA,t =
1
(1+εt)q2,t
(4.42)
Financial intermediaries earn zero profit on funds received from selling one- and two-
period bonds to the household7 (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1995, Dotsey and Ireland
1995). From (26), (27), (29), and (30), the zero profit conditions become
RN,tDt = B1,t (4.43)
RA,tAt = B2,t (4.44)
for all periods t. The left-hand sides of (4.43) and (4.44) represent the cash inflows from
7Again, if the monetary authority purchases one-period bonds, the financial intermediary earns zero
profit on funds received from selling one-period bonds to the household and the monetary authority.
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lending money in the short and long term to the firms at the end of the period t and
t+1, respectively. And the right-hand sides are cash outflows at the end of the period
t and t + 1, respectively, to the household from selling bonds. Hence, the dividend to
the households at the end of period t becomes DIVt = 0.
4.1.5 Monetary Authority
The public sector’s monetary-fiscal policy regime has to be specified to identify the
money supply M st , the net supply of short-term bonds by the central bank B
c
1,t, lump
sum transfers to the households Tt, and the price of the short-term bonds under the
government budget constraint. No government expenditure is assumed in the model.
Hence, Tt can be interpreted as net money transfer payment or lump-sum money trans-
fer to the private sector, Tt = Gt − Taxt + TPt = TPt − Taxt, where Gt, Taxt, and
TPt denote government expenditure, tax revenue and transfer payments such as social
security, pension, etc., respectively. If Tt > 0, lump-sum money is transferred to house-
holds, and Tt < 0 means lump-sum tax from households. Since the monetary authority
issues one-period bonds at the beginning of period t which pay one dollar at the end
of the period for each unit of bonds, the budget constraint of the monetary authority
becomes
M st + q1,tB
c
1,t =M
s
t−1 +B
c
1,t + Tt (4.45)
The budget constraint implies that the lump-sum money transfers are financed with
seigniorage revenues and issuing one-period bonds. Bc1,t in the right-hand side in the
government budget constraint implies that the government redeems time t one-period
bonds at the end of period t.
In order to identify the money supply in the economy rigorously, we have to spec-
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ify the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The open market operation
procedure is given by
q1,tB
c
1,t = −∆M st (4.46)
Equation (4.46) implies that when the monetary authority wants to raise short rates,
it supplies one-period bonds in the open market and withdraws the exact same amount
of money from the market for selling bonds. Now, the money supply is endogenously
determined from the open market operation condition in the economy. Equations (4.45)
and (4.46) imply that
Tt = −Bc1,t (4.47)
That is, the fiscal authority levies tax by the amount of payout for one-period bonds at
the end of time t. When the monetary authority purchases one-period bonds, Bc1,t < 0,
the money supply increases and the lump-sum money transfer is made to the house-
holds.
The monetary authority’s target rate can be achieved by adjusting the net supply
of one-period bonds through the short-term asset market. That is, the total demand
for one-period bonds can be obtained in equation (4.1) given by
q1,tB
H
1,t =Mt−1 −Qt − (1 + εt)q2,tB2,t
The one-period bond supply by financial intermediaries is given from equation (4.39)
as follows
q1,tB1,t = Dt
Assume, for example, that the one-period bond market is at its equilibrium with the
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equilibrium rate r∗1,t without intervention by the central bank, hence B
H
1,t = B1,t. When
the central bank wants to raise the target rate to r11,t, then there will be excess demand
for one-period bonds in the market at the new target rate. Using long-term financial
market optimality condition (4.44), the amount of excess demand for one-period bonds
at the target rate in the market becomes
BH1,t −B1,t = q˜−11,t (Mt−1 −Qt −Dt − At)
where q˜t denotes the new equilibrium price of a one-period bond corresponding to r
1
1,t.
This excess demand should be eliminated by the central bank by supplying one-period
bonds Bc1,t. Hence, the amount of one-period bonds supplied by the central bank to
achieve its target rate becomes
Bc1,t = q˜
−1
1,t (Mt−1 −Qt −Dt − At) (4.48)
Therefore, when the central bank sets the target rate, Bc1,t is determined endogenously
as the excess demand for one-period bonds in the market at the target rate. In summary,
when the central bank intends to raise short rates, it can be achieved by supplying one-
period bonds by the excess demand at the target rate in the market.
Without financial intermediaries, the only supplier of the short-term bonds will be
the central bank. According to Woodford (1994), in the case of interest rate policy
instead of money supply policy, the budget constraint of the central bank is given by
(4.45) and the money supply and net bond supply are no longer exogenously deter-
mined. But our model introduces financial intermediaries and the central bank is one
of the participants in the short-term bond market. From the open market operation
condition, we can see that the steady state value of one-period bonds supplied by the
monetary authority becomes zero because of ∆M s = 0 in the steady state.
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To complete our model economy, we need to specify the monetary policy rule.
Two types of monetary policy rules can be considered in order to evaluate the effect of
monetary policy: the money supply rule and the interest rate rule. Many recent leading
papers in macroeconomics follow the Taylor-type interest rule. Since the objective of
this paper is to evaluate the movement of interest rates as the source of the economic
dynamics through cost channel, the interest rate smoothing rule is used. The central
bank is assumed to respond by adjusting the short-rate target to the average expected
inflation and output deviations from their steady state values by using the following
feedback rule suggested by Erceg et al. (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2004),
i1,t = (1− ρg){i∗1 + apiEtp¯it+1 + awpiwt + ayxt}+ ρgi1,t−1 + g,t (4.49)
where i1,t denotes the short rate in period t set by the monetary authority, and i
∗
1 is
the desired level of short rate when inflation and output meet their target levels. p¯it,k
denotes the percentage change in price level between period t and t+ k, p¯it,k =
Pt+k−Pt
Pt
.
piwt =
W¯t−W¯t−1
W¯t−1
denotes wage inflation, and xt,q is a measure of the average output
deviation from steady state (or trend) between period t and t + q − 1. g,t is a mean
zero and serially uncorrelated shock to policy. As the error term is added in the policy
rule, we can capture the unforecastable shock to the interest rate when the monetary
authority formulates policy. Hence, this feedback rule consists of the sum of systematic
responses by the central bank to economic conditions and uncontrolled shock. The lag
of the short rate implies that the monetary authority reacts smoothly to deviations
from the steady state or to the shock.
By using the short-term interest rate as the policy instrument, the central bank sets
the federal funds rate target to achieve the final goal of output, price inflation, and
wage inflation stabilizations. In order to meet the operating target rate, the central
bank uses the short-term bond market, i.e., by selling or purchasing one-period bonds
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by the excess demand or supply of this bond in the market at the target rate.
4.1.6 Aggregate Resource Constraint and Market Clearing Con-
ditions
The intermediate good producing firm i confronts the following resource constraint at
time t:
ci,t + ivi,t = yi,t
where ci,t and ivi,t =
∑2
j=1 ϕjs
i
j,t are the total consumption demand for goods produced
by firm i and the economy-wide demand for investment goods produced by firm i,
respectively.
Hence, from (4.23), the time t total demand in this economy can be obtained by
summing over the total demand for differentiated intermediate goods, and the total
resource will be obtained by summing over the output produced by each intermediate
good producing firm. Hence, the aggregate resource constraint will be:
ct + ϕ1s1,t + ϕ2s2,t =
(
P¯t
Pt
)θpi
y¯t (4.50)
where P¯t
.
=
(∫ 1
0
P−θpii,t di
)− 1
θpi
and y¯t =
∫ 1
0
yi,tdi. Since the labor-capital ratio is the same
for all intermediate good producing firms, y¯t can be expressed as:
y¯t = ξt
(
Nt
Kt
)α ∫ 1
0
Ki,tdi− Y¯ = ξtNαt K1−αt − Y¯
where Kt
.
=
∫ 1
0
Ki,tdi and Nt
.
=
∫ 1
0
Ni,tdi. In order to express the labor input as
measured in the real world data (CEE), define new total labor Lt =
∫ 1
0
Nh,tdh as
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measured in the data. Using (4.7), the complete y¯t equation becomes
y¯t = ξt
(
W¯t
Wt
)αθn
LαtK
1−α
t − Y¯ (4.51)
where W¯t
.
=
(∫ 1
0
W−θnh,t dh
)− 1
θn
.
The money market clearing condition is given by
mst = mt +m
f
t (4.52)
where mft =
Mft
Pt
= 1
Pt
∫ 1
0
M fi,tdi. The money market clearing condition states that the
period t real money supply by the central bank should be the same as the sum of the
amount of real money held by all households and firms at the end of period t.
The short-term bond market should also be cleared and its condition becomes
B1,t = B
H
1,t −Bc1,t (4.53)
The short-term bond market clearing condition states that the total supply for one-
period bonds by financial intermediaries, B1,t, should be equal to the demand for
one-period bonds by households, BH1,t, minus net supply of one-period bonds by the
monetary authority, Bc1,t.
4.2 Solving the Model
This section explains how to solve the model. The first subsection collects structural
equations. The second subsection computes the steady state and the third subsection
presents log-linearized formulas of the non-linear version of the economy. In the final
subsection, the model is solved with Klein’s (2000) algorithm.
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4.2.1 Model Equations
We have five equations from the first-order conditions for households’ optimization
process: a consumption-labor relation equation, two asset pricing equations, a habit
formation, and the stochastic process of preference shock.
Et
∑∞
j=0(ωnβ)
j{1−θn
θn
pijWh,t
Pt+j
Uc,t+j − UNh,t+j}Nh,t+j = 0 (4.54)
q1t = βEt
Pt
Pt+1
Uc,t+1
Uc,t
(4.55)
(1 + εt)q2t = β
2Et
Pt
Pt+2
Uc,t+2
Uc,t
(4.56)
Uc,t = νtZ
−ζ(1−σ)
t c
−σ
t − ζβEtνt+1c1−σt+1 Z−1−ζ(1−σ)t+1 ρc
−ζβ2Etνt+2c1−σt+2 Z−1−ζ(1−σ)t+2 (1− ρc)
(4.57)
ln νt = ρν ln νt−1 + ν,t (4.58)
We have seven equations from the production sector: the definition of stochastic
discount factor, the production technology, the law of motion of capital stock, the
stochastic process of output shock, and three equations from the first-order conditions
with respect to labor, investment projects, and price.
Λt = Etβ
Uc,t+1
Pt+1
(4.59)
y¯t = ξt
(
W¯t
Wt
)αθn
LαtK
1−α
t − Y¯ (4.60)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + s2,t−1 (4.61)
ln ξt = (1− ρξ) ln ξ + ρξ ln ξt−1 + ξ,t (4.62)
Wt
q1,t
= αΥtYN,t (4.63)
−ϕ1ΛtEtPt+1β 1(1+εt)q2,tEtΛt+1(ϕ2Pt + ϕ1EtPt+1)
+β2ϕ1Et{ 1(1+εt+1)q2,t+1Λt+2 (Pt+1 − EtPt+1)} =
∑∞
j=2 β
j(1− δ)j−2EtΛt+jΥt+jYK,t+j
(4.64)
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P ∗t =
θpi
θpi−1{
αEt
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+jφt+jpi
−θpi
j P
θpi
t+jyt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+jpi
1−θpi
j P
θpi−1
t+j yt+j
+
(1−α)Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
j
∑∞
k=2 β
k(1−δ)k−2λt+j+kφt+j+kpi−θpij+k P θpit+j+kyt+j+k
s2,t+j
Kt+j+k
Et
∑∞
j=0(ωpiβ)
jλt+jpi
1−θpi
j P
θpi−1
t+j yt+j
}
(4.65)
where (4.41) and (4.42) are used for RN,t and RA,t.
Rewrite the interest rate policy rule and aggregate resource constraint
i1,t = (1− ρg){i∗1 + apiEtp¯it+1 + awpiwt + ayxt}+ ρgi1,t−1 + g,t (4.66)
ct + ϕ1s2,t−1 + ϕ2s2,t = y¯t (4.67)
Other endogenous variables can be calculated from optimization constraints and market
clearing conditions.
4.2.2 Steady State
I use the superscript ‘*’ for the steady state value of variables. The steady state values
of one- and two-period bond prices can be calculated from equation (4.55) and (4.56)
as q∗1 = R
∗−1
N = β and q
∗
2 = R
∗−1
A =
β2
1+ε∗ where ε
∗ denotes the steady state value of the
stochastic term premium. The steady state consumption-labor equation becomes
θn − 1
θn
w∗c∗σ(ζ−1)−ζ [1− ζβρc − ζβ2(1− ρc)] = ψL∗η (4.68)
where w∗ denotes the steady state of real wages, wt = WtPt , and ψL
∗η in the right-hand
side of (4.68) is the negative steady state marginal utility of labor. Since Wh,t = W
∗
h =
W ∗ in the steady state, W¯t = Wt holds in the steady state, and N∗ = L∗ is used in
(4.68).
From the production sector, we have five steady state equations. They correspond
to equations (4.60), (4.61), (4.63) to (4.65), and the zero profit condition holds in the
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steady state.
y∗ = L∗αK∗1−α − Y¯ (4.69)
K∗ = δs∗2 (4.70)
w∗R∗N = αφ
∗ ( L∗
K∗
)1−α
(4.71)
−ϕ1 + βR∗A = 1−α1−β(1−δ)β2φ∗
(
L∗
K∗
)α
(4.72)
1 = θpi
θpi−1φ
∗
(
α+ (1− α) β2
1−β(1−δ)
s∗2
K∗
)
(4.73)
y∗ = R∗Nw
∗L∗ +R∗As
∗
2 (4.74)
where φ∗ denotes the steady state real marginal cost. Since P¯t = Pt in the steady state,
y¯∗ = y∗ is used in (4.69) and (4.74).
The steady state aggregate resource constraint becomes
c∗ + s∗2 = y
∗ (4.75)
because ϕ1 + ϕ2 = 1 and s1,t = s2,t in the steady state.
4.2.3 Linearization of the Model
The log-linearized values around their steady state values are applied for the linear
approximation expression. The symbol ‘^’ denotes a small deviation from the steady
state value. The linearizing expression for equations (4.54) to (4.67) becomes
b1Lˆt − b2Uˆc,t + b3wˆt + b4wˆt−1 + b5Etwˆt+1 + b6pˆit + b4pˆit−1 + b5Etpˆit+1 = 0 (4.76)
Uˆc,t + qˆ1,t = EtUˆc,t+1 − Etpˆit+1 (4.77)
Uˆc,t +
1
1+ε
εˆt + qˆ2,t = EtUˆc,t+2 − Etpˆit+1 − Etpˆit+2 (4.78)
Uˆc,t = c1νˆt + c2cˆt−2 + c3cˆt−1 + c4cˆt + c5Etcˆt+1 + c6Etcˆt+2 (4.79)
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νˆt = ρν νˆt−1 + ν,t (4.80)
λˆt = EtUˆc,t+1 − Etpˆit+1 (4.81)
y∗yˆt = L∗αK∗1−α(ξˆt + αLˆt + (1− α)Kˆt) (4.82)
Kˆt+2 = (1− δ)Kˆt+1 + δsˆ2,t (4.83)
ξˆt = ρξ ξˆt−1 + ξ,t (4.84)
φˆt = −ξˆt − qˆ1,t + wˆt + (1− α)Lˆt − (1− α)Kˆt (4.85)
d1λˆt + d2Etλˆt+1 + d3Etλˆt+2 = d4Etpˆit+1 + d5Etpˆit+2
+d6Et
(
φˆt+2 + ρ
2
ξ ξˆt + α(Lˆt+2 − Kˆt+2)
)
+ d7RˆA,t + d8EtRˆA,t+1 (4.86)
a1pˆit + a2pˆit−1 + a3Etpˆit+1 + a4Etpˆit+2
= a5sˆ2,t + a6Et2ˆ2,t+1 + a7Kˆt+2 + a8φˆt + a9
(
λˆt + yˆt
)
+a10Etφˆt+1 + a11Et
(
λˆt+1 + yˆt+1
)
+ a12Et
(
λˆt+2 + φˆt+2 + yˆt+2
) (4.87)
c∗cˆt + ϕ1s∗2sˆ2,t−1 + ϕ2s
∗
2sˆ2,t = y
∗yˆt (4.88)
−qˆ1,t = h1Etpˆit+1 + h2yˆt + h3pˆiwt − ρg qˆ1,t−1 + g,t (4.89)
where appropriate parameters are used for aj, bj, cj and dj. λˆt denotes the small
deviation of the marginal utility of Pt units of currency from its steady state, and is
from λt = ΛtPt.
One thing should be noted regarding (4.76), (4.82), (4.85), (4.86), and (4.88). Re-
write the Calvo-type price evolution equation (4.35) using q¯t =
P¯t
Pt
:
q¯−θpit = (1− ωpi)q−θpit + ωpipi−θpit−1 q¯−θpit piθpit (4.90)
where qt =
P ∗t
Pt
. The linearized expression for (4.90) will be reduced to
ˆ¯qt = ωpiˆ¯qt−1 (4.91)
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Equation (4.91) implies that, when we start from the steady state, then ˆ¯qt = 0 for all
t (CEE).
With the same logic, the linearized form of the Calvo-type wage evolution equation
will be reduced to
ˆ¯wt = ωn ˆ¯wt−1 (4.92)
where w¯t =
W¯t
Wt
= ˜¯wt
wt
and ˜¯wt = W¯tPt implying ˆ¯wt = 0 for all t if we assume ˆ¯w0 = 0.
Therefore, ˆ¯wt = wˆt.
Since ˆ¯yt = −θpiˆ¯qt + yˆt, Lˆt = −θn ˆ¯wt + Nˆt, y∗ = y¯∗, and L∗ = N∗, I drop ˆ¯qt and ˆ¯wt,
and replace ˆ¯yt with yˆt, and Nˆt with Lˆt conveniently in (4.76), (4.82), (4.85), (4.86), and
(4.88) by assuming ˆ¯q0 = 0 and ˆ¯w0 = 0.
4.2.4 The Solution Algorithm
After log-linearizing the structural equations, the model is solved with Klein’s (2000)
algorithm. Let XMt denote a vector of endogenous variables. The linear rational ex-
pectations model is expressed with the linear difference system,
AEtX
M
t+1 = BX
M
t + Czt
where zt = (ξ,t, ν,t, εt, g,t)
′ is a vector of exogenous variables and A, B, and C are
matrices of coefficients with the dimensions of 33×33, 33×33, and 33×4 respectively.
Let kt and dt denote a pre-determined variable vector and forward-looking variable
vector, respectively. Then, the endogenous variable vector can be decomposed with
xt =
 kt
dt

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.By applying Klein’s (2000) solution, the pre-determined variable vector and forward
looking variable vector will be given by
dt = Fkt +Nzt
kt+1 = Rkt + Lzt
In order to have a unique solution, the model has to satisfy following conditions: (i)
the number of stable eigenvalues of matrix pair (A,B)= the number of pre-determined
variables (ns = nk), (ii) there is no complex number z with |z| = 1 and |Az − B| = 0,
(iii) there exists a complex number z such that |Az−B| 6= 0, and (iv) Z11 is invertible
where the generalized Schu¨r form is given by QAZ = S and QBZ = T , and Z11 is the
upper left-hand ns × nk block of Z.
4.3 Policy Simulation
4.3.1 Calibration
Parameter values are chosen to closely follow the equilibrium real-business-cycle liter-
ature. The value of labor share α in the Cobb-Douglas production technology is set to
be 0.64. β is set to be 1.03−1/4, implying a 3% annual rate of interest in the steady
state. The parameter value of η is set to be 0.5, which implies that the wage elasticity
of labor supply is 2. This value is greater than 1, which is used by Jung (2004) and
CEE (2005), but smaller than 4 which Yun (1996) adopts.
The scale parameter ψ is set to imply that non-stochastic steady state employment
is normalized to unity. This calibration results in ψ = 0.1087. I set the fixed cost Y¯
so that profits are zero in steady state. The rate of depreciation δ is set to be 0.026,
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implying that the annual rate of depreciation becomes 0.1. The inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of consumption is chosen to be 10.2 and the habit formation parameter ζ is
set to be 0.8. Empirical estimations on habit formation by Fuhrer (2000) suggest
relatively high values of σ and ζ. His GMM estimates result in 13.02 and 0.9 for σ and
ζ, respectively. ρc, the weight on time t− 1 consumption in the reference consumption
level, Zt, is set to be 0.6, which implies that households put more weight on time t− 1
consumption than consumption further back in time.
I set ϕ1 = 0.7. This fraction implies that the time-to-build technology requires
more resources in physical construction of investment projects than in designing the
projects. By comparing to Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) general four-period time-
to-build technology, this value might be the sum of fractions of resources allocated in
investment projects 1 to 3 periods away from completion, ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3.
The price and wage stickiness parameters ωpi and ωn are set to be 0.3. They are
smaller than the 0.6 that is used in CEE (2005). But, according to the study by Bils
et.al. (2003), the degree of price stickiness differs across consumption categories. The
median duration of prices across the 350 categories is 4.3 months, which corresponds
to ωpi = 0.3575, and prices are more flexible for goods, whose duration is 3.2 months or
ωpi = 0.27, than for services (7.8 months). The price elasticity of demand for good i, θpi,
and the wage elasticity of demand for labor h, θn, are set to be 1.7 and 23, respectively.
Those from CEE (2005) are 6 and 21, respectively.
Parameters in the interest rate smoothing rule are utilized as shown in the following
equation.
iˆ1,t = 0.56ˆi1,t−1 + 0.44(1.15Etpˆit+1 + 0.7yˆt + 0.03pˆiwt )
api = 1.15 is much smaller than the estimate of 2.15 by Clarida et al. (2000). But
both numbers imply an active monetary policy fighting inflation by raising the nominal
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short-rate by more than the increase of inflation. Moreover, (1− ρg)api = 0.5060 of my
model is greater than the 0.4515 in Clarida et al. (2000). As the estimation results by
Amato and Laubach (2004) suggest, the relatively small but positive weight on wage
inflation aw = 0.03 is used. The parameter values and their description can be found
in Table 4.1.
4.3.2 Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock in the
Baseline Model
Figure 4.1 displays the IRFs of various macroeconomic aggregates in the baseline model.
A contractionary monetary policy shock is given to generate an initial increase in the
short rate of approximately 60 basis points, whose value corresponds to the empirical
counterpart of the initial response of the federal funds rate in the previous chapter.
The results are qualitatively similar to the empirical responses shown in Figure 2.2
in that output shows a hump-shaped movement and inflation increases at first. Output
drops by a maximum of 0.66% four quarters after the shock and inflation increases
by a maximum of 0.77% three quarters after the shock. The response of inflation
clearly reflects the dominance of the cost channel effect of monetary policy. Figure 4.2
compares the performance of two different measures of inflation. In the top panel, the
dotted line represents inflation measured as the difference in log of price level at time
t and t− 1, and the solid line displays the difference in log of price level at time t and
t− 4 which is used in the empirical analysis. The bottom panel of the figure plots two
different real short-term rates based on two different inflation definitions. The empirical
counterpart inflation, pˆi4t = Pˆt − Pˆt−4, shows more gradual increase and its maximum
response is over 3%. The real short-term interest rate rˆ41,t also shows a larger and more
persistent response than rˆ1,t. These results emphasize that the model’s implications for
inflation exceed the empirical response.
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The initial response of the short rate to the monetary policy shock raises long
rates in the direction that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure predicts.
The initial increase in the two-period rate is 58 basis points. These increased interest
rates push up the production cost and reduce labor demand and long-term investment
projects. Those reduced factor inputs restrict current and future output, and the
increased production cost raises inflation. The long rate shown in Figure 4.1 is the
5-year rate response which is implied by the model. That is, the first-step response of
the 5-year rate is computed as the average of one- to 61-step responses of the one-period
rate. A contractionary monetary policy raises the 5-year rate in the direction which
the expectations hypothesis predicts.
In Figure 4.1, co-movements of real wages with output also imply that the cost
channel effect is dominant in the model economy. The reduced labor demand from
higher financing costs induces real wages to fall by a maximum of 0.29%. The increased
nominal short rate due to the policy shock also changes the labor supply curve as shown
in (4.14) for sticky wages or in (4.15) for flexible wages. The negative response of real
interest rates to the policy shock (we will return to this subject later in this section)
reduces the marginal utility of consumption. Hence, the labor supply curve shifts in,
and the equilibrium amount of labor falls. Reduced real wages reflect the fact that the
drop in labor demand caused by the cost channel is greater than the reduction of labor
supply effected by the demand channel.
Note that while the increased short rate plays a dominant role in the initial move-
ment of inflation, the persistence of the cost channel effect comes from the existence
of time-to-build lags and the long-term loan market. The raised short rate from a
contractionary monetary policy shock reduces labor input due to higher short-term
borrowing cost. Hence output falls and inflation rises. The short-rate response to the
initial policy shock also affects the long-term interest rate that, in turn, restricts the
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investment behavior of firms because of higher financing cost. The capital stock falls,
too, with time lags which reflect the time-to-build technology. Hence, more expensive
investment projects reduce future aggregate output and raise future inflation.
The upward response of consumption to a contractionary monetary policy shock
needs more explanation. A standard demand channel theory of monetary policy trans-
mission predicts consumption will respond in the same direction as output. In the cost
channel dominant economy, a contractionary policy shock causes aggregate demand to
fall through the following mechanism. Because of the higher financing cost of invest-
ment projects from a contractionary monetary policy shock, demand for s2,t falls. Due
to the time-to-build lags, today’s drop in investment projects decreases future output
which, in turn, reduces future aggregate supply. Contrary to the reliance of invest-
ment projects on the nominal long rate, the response of consumption, which consists of
aggregate demand together with investments, is related to the change of real interest
rates defined as rˆ1,t = iˆ1,t−Etpˆit+1. Since inflation rises more than the drop in nominal
short rate, real interest rates fall and consumption increases. To be precise, when the
investment projects are so sensitive with respect to the interest cost, the reduction of
s2,t exceeds the amount of the drop in output caused by reduced labor input. Without
the change of demand for consumption, the amount of the drop in aggregate demand is
greater than the reduction of the aggregate output. Hence, the price level tends to fall.
If the price reduction in the goods market is large enough to make the goods cheaper
relative to reduced asset prices, households purchase more goods by rearranging their
cash position Qt, even though labor income shrinks. Therefore, the response of ct to
the monetary policy shock moves in the opposite direction of s2,t.
The puzzling movement of consumption can be mitigated by increasing the value
of the habit formation parameter ζ. When ζ converges to one, the current utility
depends more on the consumption habit. In this case, the contractionary monetary
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policy shock reduces the size of current consumption and increases expected future
reference levels of consumption in order to smooth consumption more across time. In
the limiting case, the real interest rate only gives us long run directional information
on the consumption response. The solid lines with dots in Figure 4.3 clearly show that,
when only consumption relative to previous consumption matters, the consumption
moves downward along the real interest rate. In this case, the maximum point of
consumption is 0.001% one quarter after the policy shock, which corresponds to a
maximum increase of 0.09% from its steady state in the baseline model four quarters
after the shock, and to a maximum increase of 0.12% in no-habit formation (ζ = 0)
one quarter after the shock. The only difference between ζ = 0 and ζ = 1 is the
consumption response. It does not affect the behavior of other variables at all.
In summary, a contractionary monetary policy shock increases the financing cost of
labor, which induces the downward response of output. Through the term structure
of interest rates, the monetary policy shock also affects agents’ expectations on future
short-rate paths and, therefore, long rates. Increased long rates reduce the demand
for long-term investment projects by increasing financing cost, which then reduces
future output. A goods price which has become cheaper relative to bond prices causes
households to purchase more goods. The amount of net response in aggregate demand
together with the amount of the response in aggregate supply determines the dominance
of the monetary policy transmission channel. Since overall aggregate demand response,
the sum of sˆ2,t and cˆt responses, to the contractionary monetary policy shock is smaller
than the reduction of aggregate supply caused by reduced labor input, the output level
falls and inflation rises.
The results of the cost channel effect in the model are based on the monopolistically
competitive output and labor markets and frictionless financial market assumption.
My model leads to the same conclusion as that reported by Chevalier and Scharfstein
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(1996). They showed that the output price moves in the counter-cyclical direction and
real wages co-move with output under the monopolistically competitive output market
and the imperfect capital market assumption. My model contains the imperfection in
the asset market rather than in the loan market. But the asset market imperfection
does not change the response of aggregate variables because agents consider the shock
from the asset market to be a temporary shock (white noise shock). Moreover, the
only way that the asset market shock can influence the economy is through the cost
channel by raising long-term financing cost in the production sector. But the asset
market shock is blocked from being transferred to other sectors, in particular, to the
loan market. That is, the positive asset market shock immediately reduces the long-
term bond price by the exact same amount of shock, and the long-term bond price
returns to the pre-shock level at the very next period. Hence it does not change the
agents’ expectations as shown in the equation below, which states the term structure
of interest rates driven by (4.77) and (4.78).
1
1 + ε
εˆt + qˆ2,t = qˆ1,t + Etqˆ1,t+1
This reflects the fact that the current and expected future short-rate movements and the
asset market shock affect current long rates, but the inverse is not true.8 By combining
(4.42) with the above term structure equation, we obtain the equation for the return
on long-term loans which is the sum of current and expected future short-term bond
prices.
RˆA,t = −qˆ1,t − Etqˆ1,t+1 (4.93)
8When εt is assumed to have AR(1) process, the asset market shock has an effect on the whole
economy. That is, when the positive persistent asset market shock is detected, the market raises
current short-term bond prices and expects the short-term bond price to increase in the future.
100
Since the term structure shock does not disturb current short-term bond price or agents’
expectations, the asset market shock has no effect on the whole economy.
4.3.3 Role of Loan Markets
The loan markets play a crucial role in generating the cost channel effect. Without
the loan markets, firms are assumed to use the sales revenue to cover factor costs and
investment project costs. Therefore, the marginal cost is not a function of nominal
interest rates. Hence there is no direct effect of monetary policy on the production
sector. Households purchase short- and long-term bonds from financial intermediaries
as in the baseline model. The central bank participates in the short-term bond mar-
ket. Before purchasing bonds, households are assumed to resell pre-matured long-term
bonds to financial intermediaries. After observing the shock, households rebalance their
portfolios by purchasing short- and long-term bonds from financial intermediaries. If a
long-term loan market exists, the optimality condition in the loan market connects the
long-term asset prices to the returns on long-term loan contracts, which is a function
of marginal costs of investment projects. Therefore, without a long-term loan market,
the price change of long-term bonds does not affect other macro variables.
Figure 4.4 displays the IRFs for a version of a model which does not have loan
markets. I set the fraction of resources allocated in s1,t as ϕ1 = 0.504
9 and hold other
parameters at the same values as in the baseline model. As shown in the third and
fourth rows of the first column in the figure, the downward response of inflation and the
upward response of real wages to the contractionary monetary policy shock imply that
the demand channel prevails in the economy. The initial and maximum fall of inflation
is 0.24%, and real wages rise by 0.16% initially. Given the unchanged price level, the
contractionary monetary policy shock increases interest rates. Since the consumption
9The baseline model is stable when 0.503 ≤ ϕ1 ≤ 0.829, and the results are robust for the change
of ϕ1.
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goods becomes more expensive than bonds, households reduce consumption. Because
of the reduction of aggregate demand, production levels also fall by using less labor and
capital. The reduced investment projects shift the aggregate demand more to the left.
Hence, the price level drops as a result of the contractionary monetary policy shock.
Households also reduce labor supply for every level of real wages. Since the decrease
in labor supply caused by the demand-side effect is stronger than the drop in labor
demand caused by the cost-side effect, real wages rise and equilibrium employment
shrinks.
Despite sticky prices and wages, and the time-to-build technology, when firms can-
not access loan markets, only interest rates and consumption show staggered responses.
Macro variables such as output and inflation are less persistent than those of the baseline
model. These results emphasize the role of long-term interest rates and the long-term
loan market in generating persistent responses.
4.3.4 Sticky Prices and Wages
In this section, I examine the role of sticky prices and wages. Figure 4.5 displays the
IRFs with three different restrictions. The solid lines represent the IRFs from the
baseline model, the dashed lines represent the IRFs from the flexible price model in
which I impose ωpi = 0, the solid lines with dots are the IRFs from the flexible wage
model in which the restriction ωn = 0 is given, and the solid lines with diamonds display
the flexible price and wage model in which I set ωpi = ωn = 0. In each model, I hold
the other parameter values unchanged as in the baseline model.
In the flexible price model, the responses of the variables do not show substantial
differences from the baseline model. The major influence of the restriction is that it
slightly exaggerates the rise in inflation and drop in input factors such as labor and
investment projects. The decreased inflation reduces real wages slightly more than
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in the baseline model. But all variables continue to show that the cost channel is
the dominant monetary policy transmission channel. They also display substantial
staggered behaviors even though flexible prices are assumed.
The wage stickiness assumption has two major impacts on the economy. Sticky
wages increase the persistency of responses in the sense that the variables’ maximal
impact arrives several quarters after the shock. When nominal wage rigidity is assumed,
the reduction in output takes four quarters after the shock to reach its maximal drop
of 0.65%, compared to two quarters after the shock in flexible wages. Inflation in
the wage stickiness model reaches its maximum rise of 0.77% three quarters after the
shock, compared to one quarter after the shock in flexible wages. Capital takes nine
quarters to reach a maximum drop of 0.13% from its steady state value in the flexible
wage model, whereas twelve quarters are required to reach a maximal fall of 0.18%
in the baseline model. Labor takes nine quarters to reach the pre-shock level in the
flexible wage model, but it requires twelve quarters to recover its pre-shock level in the
baseline model. Nominal wage rigidity is an important factor in driving real wages in
the direction that the cost channel effect implies. The positive movement of real wages
in the flexible wage assumption indicates that the contractionary monetary policy shock
raises the nominal wage beyond the amount of the price increase.
The only difference between the flexible price and wage model and the flexible wage
model is the magnitude of the response of inflation. Persistent responses relative to
the flexible wage model are not detected across all variables. But, even if we do not
impose the sticky price and wage assumption, the responses of variables take some time
to recover the original level. This result implies that the time-to-build technology and
long-term financing contracts are critical factors in generating the staggered responses.
For example, the negative response of output to a contractionary monetary policy shock
takes almost twelve quarters to return to its pre-shock level in all models. As in the
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flexible wage but sticky price model, real wages in the flexible price and wage model
move in the opposite direction to the output response. This indicates that sticky wages
ensure that real wages respond in the direction that the cost channel effect of the
monetary policy predicts.
4.3.5 Technology Shock and Preference Shock
This section examines the impact of two macroeconomic shocks on the model economy.
The main purpose of this section is to investigate whether my model can generate
results similar to those in previous studies. The one-standard deviation of technology
and preference shocks are given.
Figure 4.6 displays the impulse response functions to a technology shock. A positive
technology shock raises output and investment, reduces inflation, and increases interest
rates two periods after the shock. The output response comes from an increase in the
current marginal productivity of labor, YN,t, and future marginal productivity of capital,
YK,t+i, i > 2, as shown in (4.31) and (4.32). The increase in investment projects reflects
the fact that firms tend to launch more projects at time t to meet the increased future
demand for capital. The initial response of the short rate is due exclusively to the
reduced inflation induced by the shock. Monetary policy reduces the nominal short
rate in response to the technology shock. The response of output, inflation and interest
rates are qualitatively similar to the study by Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valles (2002,
hereafter GLV) for the Volcker-Greenspan period.
A negative response of labor to a positive technology shock is observed in Figure
4.6. Sticky prices and habit formation play an important role in explaining the nega-
tive response of labor discussed belows. Standard real business cycle theory indicates
that factor inputs should co-move with a technology shock. For example, GLV (2002)
reported the insignificant but positive response of labor to a positive technology shock.
104
But recent studies regarding technology shocks as a source of economic fluctuation,
such as Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004), reported the negative response of labor to a positive
technology shock. Their results are based on the DSGE model with price and wage
stickiness together with habit formation, which is the same as in my model. They
reported that output and nominal interest rate rise but inflation falls, and labor moves
down first. As Gal´ı and Rabanal (2004) argued, the presence of nominal frictions could
generate the negative response of labor to the positive technology shock. For example,
when prices are not fully flexible, the increase in aggregate demand cannot compensate
for the increase in ex ante aggregate output from the positive technology shock. Hence,
the equilibrium output is produced at the aggregate demand level, which requires less
labor input than the pre-shock level of labor input. More precisely, a technology shock
increases output capacity. Given unchanged labor input, firms can produce more out-
put. Therefore, the aggregate supply curve moves out. If price is fixed at the pre-shock
level, it generates excess supply in the goods market at that price level. So, firms pro-
duce output only to aggregate demand level, given the price level, even if they are able
to produce more with the new production capacity. Therefore, firms have to reduce
labor input in order to produce the previous output level along the increased output
capacity.
There are, however, alternative interpretations of the negative response of labor to
a technology shock, such as that of Francis and Ramey (2005). They showed that habit
formation in consumption combined with adjustment costs in investment can generate
the negative impact of technology on labor input even if the flexible price assumption
is adopted. They argued that households prefer to smooth their consumption across
time when a positive technology shock is given, and the extra resources are spent on
leisure.
A positive technology shock raises real wages because prices are not fully fixed at
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the pre-shock level. Also, the downward response of labor to a technology shock beyond
two periods comes from the cost channel.10 The short rate response two periods after
the shock is close to zero, which implies that the effect of the short rate on the firms’
labor decisions is small. But positive short-rate responses beyond three periods after
the shock cause firms to use less labor input because of higher interest cost together
with higher wage cost. That is, the higher output as a result of the technology shock
raises the short-term interest rate through the monetary policy action, and the increased
financing cost reduces labor demand. This interpretation of the response of labor to the
technology shock is no different from the argument by GLV (2002) that the monetary
policy action plays an important role for the transmission of technology shocks.
Figure 4.7 shows the impulse response functions to a positive preference shock.
The exogenous positive preference shock stimulates consumption directly by increasing
money holdings, Qt, at the sacrifice of the demand for assets. This, in turn, results
in the rise of nominal interest rates. The increased consumption expenditure drives
firms to produce more goods by increasing labor input. The change of capital stock
arrives two periods after the preference shock because of the time-to-build technology.
In contrast to the response of labor, which can be fully explained by the direct effect
of demand shock, the decrease in investment projects is due to the increased financing
cost.
Even if factor inputs are used in the same production process, their responses to
shocks are totally different. In the case of preference shock, the response of labor relies
mainly on the demand factor, but the cost channel is more important for the movement
of capital. The positive movement of inflation reflects the fact that the demand-side
effect is dominant when the preference shock is observed. The impulse responses of
output, inflation, and interest rates in Figure 4.7 are directionally the same as those of
10Because of the negative co-movements of output and inflation for the first few periods, the response
of the short rate as a policy instrument remains around zero.
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Evans and Marshall (2002).
4.3.6 Response of the Yield Curve
This section investigates the effect of macro variables on the yield curve and compares
their results to the empirical counterparts. Since my DSGE model has only one- and
two-period maturity bonds, we can observe only limited results on the yield curve
response to macroeconomic shocks. But, even if it has only two different maturity yields,
the model gives us enough information on the direction of the yield curve response.
The first row of Figure 4.8 depicts the impulse response functions of the yield curve
to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the VAR with quarterly data. The short
rate is measured as the federal funds rate and the 5-year rate is used as a long rate. The
second to fourth rows in the figure display the model-based impulse response functions
of the yield curve to three macroeconomic shocks, respectively: policy shock, technology
shock, and preference shock. The level of the yield curve response is calculated as the
average of 1- and 20-period (5-year) interest rate responses. The slope of the yield
curve response is measured as the long-term interest rate minus short-term interest
rate responses. The response of a 20-period rate is calculated from the expectations
hypothesis, which is implied by the model.
Empirical results in the first row show that the monetary policy shock raises the
level and flattens the slope when the yield curve has positive slope. These results
imply that the monetary policy shock affects the long rates in the direction that the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates predicts. This result
is also found in many studies, such as Edelberg and Marshall (1996) and Evans and
Marshall (2002).
The model generates the positive response of the level of the yield curve to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock, as shown in the second row of the figure, and the
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response of the slope decreases. These results are similar to their empirical counter-
parts in the previous chapter, which are shown in the first row of Figure 4.8. But the
model predicts more persistent response of the slope than the empirical result, which
implies that the long-rate response is very small relative to the short-rate response in
the model, compared to the empirical long-rate response.
The third row in the figure displays the impulse response functions of the level and
slope of the yield to a one standard deviation positive technology shock. The shock
raises both the level and slope of the yield curve. The positive response of the slope
implies that the technology shock causes the market’s expectations of interest rates
to rise. That is, market participants expect that the increased output will cause the
central bank to raise the short rate to stabilize the output gap. The slope response to
the technology shock is similar to the results of Evans and Marshall (2002) with a full
information identification strategy.
The impulse response of the level and slope of the yield curve to a one standard
deviation preference shock is displayed in the fourth row of Figure 4.8. The positive
preference shock raises the level of the yield curve. Both the initial inflation and
output responses cause the policy authority to raise the short rate, resulting in the
positive response of the level of the yield curve. The negative response of the slope
to the preference shock is observed. Even though my model adopts the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure, the result of the slope response is the same as Evans
and Marshall’s (2002) study, in which they relied on the role of the term premium to
explain the prolonged negative response of the slope.
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Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Values Descriptions
β 1.03−1/4 Time discount factor
η 0.5 Inverse of wage elasticity of labor supply
α 0.64 Steady state labor share
δ 0.026 Rate of depreciation of capital stock
ψ 0.1087 Scale parameter in the utility function
σ 10.2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumption
ζ 0.8 Habit persistence
ρc 0.6 Weight on the last consumption in the habit formation
ϕ1 0.7 Fraction of resource in the 1st stage projects
ϕ2 0.3 Fraction of resource in the 2nd stage projects
ρξ 0.96 AR(1) coefficient of technology shock
ρν 0.7 AR(1) coefficient of preference shock
ρg 0.56 Interest rate smoothing parameter
api 1.15 Coefficient of inflation in the policy rule
ay 0.7 Coefficient of output gap in the policy rule
aw 0.03 Coefficient of wage inflation in the policy rule
ωpi 0.3 Probability of firm i re-optimizing the price
ωn 0.3 Probability of household h re-optimizing the wage
θpi 1.7 Price elasticity of demand for good i
θn 23 Wage elasticity of demand for labor h
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Figure 4.1: Impulse responses to monetary policy shock: Baseline model
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A contractionary monetary policy shock which generates 60 basis points’ initial rise in the
short rate is given. iS,t, iL,t, pit, wt, Lt, yt, ct, St, Kt, and rS,t represent short rate, long rate,
inflation, real wages, labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital, and real short
rate, respectively. The baseline model contains sticky prices and wages, and habit formation.
The 5-year rate impulse response, iL,t, is calculated from the expectations hypothesis, which
is implied in the model.
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Figure 4.2: Two different inflation performances
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In the top panel, the dash-dotted line represents the inflation measured as pˆit = Pˆt − Pˆt−1,
and the solid line displays pˆi4t = Pˆt− Pˆt−4, which is used in the empirical analysis. The dash-
dotted line in the bottom panel represents the real short rate defined as rˆ1,t = iˆ1,t− pˆit+1, and
the solid line is defined as rˆ41,t = iˆ1,t − pˆi4t+1.
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Figure 4.3: Limiting case of habit formation: ζ = 0 vs. ζ = 1
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A contractionary monetary policy shock which generates 60 basis points; initial rise in the
short rate is given. iS,t, iL,t, pit, wt, Lt, yt, ct, St, Kt, and rS,t represent short rate, long rate,
inflation, real wages, labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital, and real short
rate, respectively. The solid lines represent the impulse response functions of the baseline
model. The solid lines with dots plot the impulse response functions when ζ = 1. The dashed
lines depict the impulse response functions when ζ = 0.
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Figure 4.4: Without loan markets
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Firms are assumed not to use loan markets. ϕ1 = 0.504 is used. A contractionary monetary
policy shock which generates 60 basis points’ initial rise in the short rate is given. i(1, t),
i(2, t), p(t), w(t), L(t), y(t), c(t), S(t), K(t), and r(1, t) represent one-period rate, two-period
rate, inflation, real wages, labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital, and one-
period real rate, respectively.
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Figure 4.5: Without nominal rigidities
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iS,t, iL,t, pit, wt, Lt, yt, ct, St, Kt, and rS,t represent short rate, long rate, inflation, real wages,
labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital, and real short rate, respectively.
The solid lines represent the baseline model, the dashed lines represent the flexible price
model set by ωpi = 0, the solid lines with dots represent the flexible wage model set by
ωn = 0, and the solid lines with diamonds are the flexible price and wage model set by
ωpi = ωn = 0. Contractionary monetary policy shocks which generate an initial rise of 60
basis points in the short rate are given.
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Figure 4.6: Technology shock: ξˆt = ρξ ξˆt−1 + ξ,t
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i(1, t), i(2, t), p(t), w(t), L(t), y(t), c(t), S(t), K(t), and r(1, t) represent one-period rate, two-
period rate, inflation, real wage, labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital, and
one-period real rate, respectively. A one standard deviation positive technology shock (ξ,t)
is given.
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Figure 4.7: Preference shock: νˆt = ρν νˆt−1 + ν,t
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i(1, t), i(2, t), p(t), w(t), L(t), y(t), c(t), S(t), K(t), and r(1, t) represent one-period rate, two-
period rate, inflation, real wages, labor, output, consumption, investment projects, capital,
and one-period real rate, respectively. A one standard deviation positive preference shock
(ν,t) is given.
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Figure 4.8: Yield curve responses to the three macroeconomic shocks
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The first row represents the response of the level and slope of the yield curve to the contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock from the U.S. data. Three-month averages of the federal funds
rate and 5-year yields are used for short and long rates. The level is defined as 12 (i1,t + in,t),
and the slope is in,t− i1,t. Dash-dotted lines display 95% confidence intervals in the first row.
The second row represents the response of the yield curve to the monetary policy shock in
the baseline model. The impulse response of the 5-year rate which is implied by the model
is used for calculating the level and slope responses. The third and fourth rows represent the
response of the yield curve to the technology shock and preference shock, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This paper has built a DSGE model which generates the cost channel effect of monetary
policy. In this model, the price movement influenced by the monetary policy shock no
longer is a puzzling response but a natural movement when we take into account the
cost channel as well as the demand channel. When the cost channel is dominant,
counter-cyclical price movements and pro-cyclical real wage responses are observed.
The big difference of my model from previous cost channel-related studies is that
the change of long rates has a direct effect on firms’ decisions on long-term investments
by changing firms’ future marginal costs. This feature takes into consideration the
fact in the general equilibrium framework that the change of macro variables such as
investment or output has a closer relation to long rates than to short rates. In addition
to financing labor cost in the short-term loan market, firms finance their long-term
investment projects through the use of the long-term loan market. Hence, the change
of long-term rates induced by the policy shock is translated to the higher long-term
financing costs. It prolongs the time required for IRFs to recover from the shock.
Moreover, without sticky prices and wages, the existence of time-to-build lags and of
the multi-period financing contracts ensures that output and price responses are more
persistent.
The term structure of interest rates plays a critical role as a policy transmission
channel. The changes in short rates have an effect on firms’ future economic activity
through the term structure of interest rates. This implies that, contrary to previous
studies on the term structure, long rates have a bilateral relationship with macro vari-
ables. The long rates are determined from the market’s expectations on short rates, and
the change of long rates, in turn, affects the future marginal cost of firms by changing
financing costs.
Standard new Keynesian models put an emphasis on the existence of nominal rigidi-
ties to explain the persistence in the response of macro variables to the monetary policy
shock. Despite the limited role of sticky prices in generating the persistent responses,
sticky wages amplify the staggered responses and help explain the response of real
wages observed in the data. My model also finds that, even if flexible prices and wages
are assumed, the economy takes some time to return to its pre-shock levels. This is
ascribed to the existence of time-to-build lags and long term loan markets. The policy
shock changes current investment projects which will be used in the future production
process because of the higher long-term borrowing cost to finance the projects.
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